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CASE COMMENTS
TORTS

MINNESOTA DRAMSHOP ACT - A SOCIAL HOST WHO ILLEGALLY
FURNISHES INTOXICATING LIQUOR Is LIABLE FOR INJURY TO A THIRD PERSON

RESULTING FROM

THE INTOXICATION OF THE

GuEST.-Appellant Delmar Ross

and Joel Owen Johnson purchased liquor for Ross' 19-year-old brother, Rodney
Alan Ross. Rodney became intoxicated and was killed when the auto he was
driving left the road. In consolidated actions brought on behalf of his infant son
and by the decedents parents the jury awarded judgments totaling $5,706.84,
finding Ross and Johnson liable under the Minnesota Dranishop Act.' The trial
court denied the defendants' motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
Defendant Ross appealed from the judgment in each action, but the Supreme
Court of Minnesota affirmed and held: A social host who illegally furnishes intoxicating liquor is liable for injury to a third person resulting from the intoxication of the guest.' Ross v. Ross, - Minn. -,
200 N.W.2d 149 (1972).
The court went on to acknowledge the broad implications of its holding:
While the act applies to those invited to wedding receptions and company
picnics as well as other gatherings where supervision may be onerous, no
reason occurs to us why those who furnish liquor to others, even on social occasions, should not be responsible for protecting innocent third persons from
the potential damages of indiscriminately furnishing such hospitality
While there are decisions to the contrary,4 the general rule at common law
was that there was no cause of action in favor of one injured by an intoxicated
person against the furnisher of the intoxicating liquor.5 In 1889 the Supreme
Court of Illinois stated in dictum, without citation to authority, that it was not
a tort to sell or give intoxicating liquor to a strong and able-bodied man." This
statement has since been extended by many courts to mean that a liquor vendor
is not responsible to third parties for an inebriated customer's conduct. These
courts usually hold that the proximate cause of the injuries is the consumption of
the liquor, not the sale.' In Minnesota, the common law rule that there was no
1

MINN. STAT. ANN. § 340.95 (1972) provides:

Every husband, wife, child, parent, guardian, employer, or other person who is
injured in person or property, or means of support, by any intoxicated person, or
by the intoxication of any person, has a right of action, in his own name, against any
person who, by illegally selling, bartering or giving intoxicating liquors, caused the
intoxication of such person, for all damages, sustained; and all damages recovered
by a minor under this section shall be paid either to such minor or to his parent,
guardian, or next friend, as the court directs; and all suits for damages under this
section shall be by civil action in any court of this state having jurisdiction thereof.
2
3

Ross v. Ross, Minn. , 200 N.W.2d 149, 150 (1972).
Id. at , 200 N.W.2d at 153.

4 Waynick v. Chicago's Last Dept. Store, 269 F.2d 322 '(7th Cir. 1959) ; Elder v. Fisher,
247 Ind. 598, 217 N.E.2d 847 (1966) ; Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 N.J. 188, 156 A.2d 1 (1959) ;
Jardine v. Upper Darby Lodge No. 1973, 413 Pa. 626, 198 A.2d 550 (1964). Contra, e.g.,
Carr v. Turner, 238 Ark. 889, 385 S.W.2d 656 (1965); Hull v. Rund, 150 Colo. 425, 374
P.2d 351 (1962); Hall v. Budagher, 76 N.M. 591, 417 P.2d 71 (1966); Harem v. Carson
City Nugget, Inc., 85 Nev. 99, 450 P.2d 358 (1969).
5 45 Au. Jua.2d IntoxicatingLiquor § 553 (1969).
6 Cruse v. Aden, 127 Ill. 231, 234, 20 N.E. 73, 74'(1889).
7 See Carr v. Turner, 238 Ark. 889, 385 S.W.2d 656 (1965); Hull v. Rund, 150 Colo.
425, 374 P.2d 351 (1962), Cowman v. Hansen, 250 Iowa 358, 92 N.W.2d 682 (1958); Meade
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cause of action against the furnisher of intoxicating liquor first appeared in 1955
in Beck v. Groe.8
Even though an injured third party had no common law cause of action, a
number of states enacted legislation which created a statutory cause of action
imposing civil liability. These statutes are variously called civil damages acts or
dramshop acts. The first such statute appeared in Maine in 1851' and at various
times some 37 states have had civil damages acts"0 with 10 states at the present
time retaining broad form acts1 ' (acts which create a cause of action for injury to
persons, property, or means of support). While the legislatures have created a
cause of action against any furnisher of the intoxicating liquor, the statutes have
almost uniformly been applied only to those who sell intoxicating liquors.'
Although dramshop or civil damage acts usually provide for the recovery of
damages from "any person" giving or selling intoxicating liquor, the general
rule appears to be well established that such statutes were not intended to
and do not create a right of action against one who gives another the
beverage as a mere act of hospitality or social courtesy and without pecuniary
gain, but instead provide a right of action only against those in the business
of selling liquor.'3
In Minnesota the supreme court has held that the operator of a liquor establishment, whether a corporation, a municipality, or a nonprofit organization, may
be made the original defendant under the dramshop act because such parties are
involved in the liquor business. 4 In Dahlin v. Kron,'5 however, it was implied
that one not engaged in the liquor business might be liable under the civil
damages act. There the court did not find the defendant immune as a social host,
but rather found that the party causing the injury was not in fact intoxicated.
Thus the question of a social host's liability under the dramshop act remained
unanswered in Minnesota until Ross. In deciding Ross the court's only inquiry
was into the 1911 legislature's purpose in enacting the dramshop act. It conv. Freeman, 93 Idaho 389, 462 P.2d 54 (1969) ; Lee v. Peerless Ins. Co., 248 La. 982, 183 So.2d
328 (1966); Hall v. Budagher, 76 N.M. 591, 417 P.2d 71 (1966); Hamm v. Carson City

Nugget, Inc., 85 Nev. 99, 450 P.2d 358 (1969); Garcia v. Hargrove, 46 Wis.2d 724, 176
N.W.2d 566 (1970).
8 245 Minn. 28, 70 N.W.2d 886 '(1955).
9 Note, Liability Under the Minnesota Civil Damage Act, 46 MINN. L. REv. 169, 170
(1961).
10 Hollerud v. Malamis, 20 Mich. App. 748, 755, 174 N.W.2d 626, 630 (1969).
11 ALA. CODE tit. 7, § 121 '(1960); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 43, § 135 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1972); IOWA CODE ANN., ch. 123, § 123.92 (Supp. 1972). ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2002
(1964); MICH. Comp. LAWS § 436.22 (1967); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 340.95 (1972); N.Y. GEN.
OBLIGATIONS LAW § 11-101 (McKinney 1964); N.D. CENT. CODE § 5-01-21 (1959); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 37, § 121 (1953); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 501 (1958). See also McGough,
Dramshop Acts, A.B.A., SECTION OF INSURANCE, NEGLIGENCE AND COMPENSATION LAW,
1966-67 PROCEEDINGS.
12 Contra, Williams v. Klemesrud, 197 N.W.2d 614 (Iowa 1972).
13 Annot., 8 A.L.R.3d 1412, 1413 (1966).
14 See Randall v. Village of Excelsior, 258 Minn. 81, 103 N.W.2d 131 (1960) (municipality); Hartwig v. The Loyal Order of Moose, 253 Minn. 347, 91 N.W. 2d 794 (1958) (nonprofit organization); Adamson v. Dougherty, 248 Minn. 535, 81 N.W.2d 110 (1957) (liquor
establishments); Schmidt v. Driscoll Hotel, Inc., 249 Minn. 376, 82 N.W.2d 365 (1957)
(corporation).
15 232 Minn. 312, 45 N.W.2d 833 (1950).
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cluded that the purpose of the act was to impose civil liability on every violator,
whether or not he was in the liquor business.'0
The dramshop act creates a cause of action in favor of an injured third
party against "any person who, by illegally selling, bartering or giving intoxicating
liquors, caused the intoxication of such person" causing the injury. 7 The court
focused its attention on the words "any person" and had very little difficulty in
finding what it believed to be the intent of the 1911 legislature.
The use of the words "any person" and the words "selling, bartering, or
giving" appear throughout both past and present Minnesota statutes regulating
the commercial vendor of intoxicating liquor.1 8 It would seem therefore that
the use of the same words in the civil damages act was meant to impose liability
only on the commercial vendor of intoxicating liquor.
When faced with the problem of interpreting the words "give," "giving
away," and "giving" in Harris u. Hardest)9 the Supreme Court of Kansas
reached the following conclusion:
In numerous sections of the prohibitory law other than the civil damages
section, giving intoxicating liquors was coupled with selling and bartering,
and in due time it became necessary to reach a conclusion respecting the
meaning of the words give, giving away, giving, and gift. The conclusion
was that [these words were] inserted in the law to circumvent the ingenuity
of those who might seek to effect sales without transgressing the letter of
the law.
The result is that under provisions of . . . the civil damages section,
the giving of intoxicating liquor means giving as a subterfuge for sale. 2°
If this interpretation of the word "give" is correct when applied to the use of
similar words in the historical development of the Minnesota statutes, then it is
16

200 N.W.2d at 150.

MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 340.95 (1972).
18 The words any person and sell, give, barter, have been used in Minnesota statutes
regulating commercial vendors of intoxicating liquor. The Law of March 3, 1887, ch. 6, §
1 [1887] Minn. Laws 41-42 provided that "any person" applying "for a license to sell intoxicating liquors" file a bond before the license would be issued, and further provided that such
person could "not sell, barter, give away or otherwise furnish or dispose of such liquors" to
certain persons. (Emphasis added.)
The Law of April 18, 1905, ch. 246, § 1 [1905] Minn. Laws 379-80 amended the 1887
statute. In addition to providing that "any person' applying for a license must file a bond,
and providing that the license could not "sell, barter, give away or otherwise furnish or
dispose" of liquor to certain classes, the Act provided that the licensee would be liable for
damages or injuries caused as a result of any violation of these conditions. The liability
language of this 1905 statute was not included in the Revised Laws of Minnesota for 1905.
The Law of April 5, 1911, ch. 83, § 1534 [1911] Minn. Laws 102 (now MiNN. STAT.
17

ANN. § 340.73 (1972))

provided that it "shall be unlawful for any person .

.

. to sell, give,

barter, furnish or dispose of in any manner, either directly or indirectly" liquors to certain
classes of persons. The year 1911 is particularly important because it was the year that the
Minnesota Civil Damage Act was enacted. The civil damages act, Law of April 18, 1911, ch.
175 [1911] Minn. Laws 221 (now MtNN. STAT. ANN. § 340.95 '(1972)), provided that
specified individuals would have a right of action "against any person, who by illegally selling,
bartering, or giving intoxicating liquors, have caused the intoxication of [the] person" causing
the injury or damage.
The repeated use of the terms any person and sell, give, barter in statutes licensing and
regulating vendors of intoxicating liquor indicate that the civil damages act, which contains
the same terms, should be applied only against those who are in the liquor business.
19 111 Kan.291, 207 P. 188 (1922).
20 Id. at 295-96, 207 P. at 190.
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clear the civil damages act should be applied only to those engaged in the liquor
business and should not be extended to the social host.
In Heveron v. Village of Belgrade"' the Supreme Court of Minnesota
searched for legislative intent with respect to complicity by the injured third party
as a possible defense in an action under the dramshop act. The court stated that
because the legislative intent was not clear it would necessarily have to look to
other states' decisions and policies relevant to the issue.22 If a similar procedure
had been used in Ross in searching for legislative intent, the court might have
reached the conclusion that a social host is not liable under the Minnesota Dramshop Act. While the court recognized decisions in Illinois and Michigan which
have directly dealt with this question, those decisions were given little consideration in the court's attempt to discover the legislative intent of the dramshop act.
The court of appeals of Illinois and the court of appeals of Michigan have
both dealt directly with the liability of a social host under a dramshop or civil
damages act. In Miller v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co., the plaintiff brought an
action under the Illinois dramshop act against an employees' association and
the employer for injuries received in an auto collision caused by an intoxicated
employee who had left an association picnic. The defendants moved for summary
judgment and the trial court granted the motion. Plaintiff appealed and the
court of appeals of Illinois affirmed, noting that while the dramshop act was to be
liberally construed to protect the health, safety and welfare of the citizens of
Illinois, the court did not believe it was the intent of the legislature to make
social drinking and the giving of intoxicating liquor to another such conduct as to
make the social host liable under the act:
In the opinion of this court, the Dram Shop Act was intended to regulate
the business of selling, distributing, manufacturing and wholesaling alcoholic
liquors for profit. In other words, it was to regulate those in the business,
not the social drinker or the social drinking of a group.24
statute, the Illinois statute
It is important to note here that, like the Minnesota
25
contains the words "any person" and "giving."
The court of appeals of Michigan, interpreting a civil damages act" very
similar to the Minnesota statute, has also refused to impose statutory civil
liability on the social host. In LeGault v. Klebba that court concluded that
21
22
23

288 Minn. 395, 181 N.W.2d 692 (1970).
Id. at 397, 181 N.W.2d at 693.
48 Ill. App.2d 412, 199 N.E.2d 300 (1964).

24
25

Id. at 423, 199 N.E.2d at 306.
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 43, § 135 (1972) provides in part:
Every person, who is injured in person or property by any intoxicated person, has a
right of action in his own name, severally or jointly, against any person who by
selling or giving alcoholic liquor, causes the intoxication of such person. (Emphasis
added.)
MicH. GomP. LAws § 436.22 (1967) provides a right of action in favor of:
Every wife, husband, child, parent, guardian or other persons who shall be injured in
person or property, means of support or otherwise, by an intoxicated person by reason
of the unlawful selling, giving or furnishing to any such persons any intoxicating
liquor, shall have a right of action in his or her name against the person who shall
by such selling or giving of any such liquor have caused or contributed to the intoxication of said person or persons or who shall have caused or contributed to any
such injury.

26
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".... it is not the law that private individuals are liable for the actions of their
social guests
who over-indulge in liquid hospitality provided at private homes or
27
parties."
The Minnesota Supreme Court has stated that liability under the dramshop
act is imposed without regard to fault.2 Under Ross, this standard of strict
liability has now been applied to the social host. This holding not only conflicts
with rulings in other jurisdictions but it ignores the underlying policy of the
dramshop acts. Justification for the imposition of a strict liability standard in
the case of vendors is based "on the theory that such business or activity can best
bear the loss occasioned by a violation of law regulating the business or activity,
even though the violation was unintentional or did not involve any deviation
from the standard of due care."'
The court has also found that the purposes
of the dramshop act are to protect the public, to penalize the licensed operator
for an illegal sale, and to compensate for injury. ° None of the policies underlying
the act warrant the imposition of strict liability on the unwary social host. Under
the Ross holding, however, a social host may be strictly liable for any damages
caused by a minor or an intoxicated person to whom he has furnished intoxicating liquor. This places upon a social host the burdensome if not impossible task
of policing his guests to make sure that no minor or intoxicated person is served
an alcoholic drink. Certainly there are circumstances where the social host,
though not negligent, will be unable to identify a minor or an individual who
has reached the point of intoxication. The social host should not be held strictly
liable for damages caused by a minor or an intoxicated person when, without
deviating from any standard of due care, he has allowed that individual to
obtain intoxicating liquor. If this liability without fault standard is applied to
the social host, the question of the injured third party's contributory negligence
is immaterial."' Should a social host who has exercised due care be liable for
injuries to a third party who could have prevented the injuries by the exercise
of due care on his own part? While it is not reasonable and is far from equitable, this is the standard to be imposed on the social host in Minnesota as a
result of the Ross decision.
Instead of imposing such a burden on the social host under the dramshop
act, a more equitable liability standard can be found at common law. As noted
earlier, the traditional view at common law has been not to allow an action by
27 7 Mich. App. 640. 643, 152 N.W.2d 712, 713 (1967) (wedding reception). In
Behnke v. Pierson, 21 Mich. App. 219, 175 N.W.2d 303 (1970) the plaintiff's deceased husband's car was struck in the rear by a car driven by Blair, an employee of the defendant, who
had attended a company picnic where he became intoxicated. The court stated:
In Michigan, recovery for such injury caused by an intoxicated person is exclusively
statutory. The statute makes no provision for holding private individuals liable for
furnishing intoxicants without pecuniary gain for social courtesy or hospitality
reasons. In this case, the holiday beverages were dispensed for no pecuniary gain
and for social and hospitable enjoyment. I-d. at 220-21, 175 N.W.2d at 303-04 (footnotes omitted).

28 Dahl v. Northwestern Nat!1 Bank, 265 Minn. 216, 219-20, 121 N.W.2d 321, 323-24
(1963).
29
30
31

Id. at 220-21, 121 N.W.2d at 324.
Id. at 219, 121 N.W.2d at 323.
Williams v. Klemesrud, 197 N.W.2d 614, 618 (Iowa 1972); Ross v. Ross,
, 200 N.W.2d 149, 154 "(1972) (dissenting opinion).

-

Minn.
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an injured third party against the furnisher of the intoxicating liquor. "The
rationale for the common law rule was that the consumption and not the sale
of liquor was the proximate cause of injuries sustained as a result of intoxication. 3 2 "[This] common law rule immunizing the furnisher of liquor from civil
liability, has been picturesquely described as a 'backeddy running counter to the
mainstream of modern tort doctrine.' " In recognition of this a growing number
of states have begun to permit common law negligence actions against hosts and
vendors of alcohol for damages caused by intoxicated guests or customers.
These jurisdictions have decided that the sale of alcoholic beverages may be the
proximate cause of injuries to an innocent third party." Some of the states which
have refused to recognize the common law cause of action do so because they
choose to defer the whole area to legislative action.3" In addition, it has been
indicated that to allow this action against a vendor would be to open the door
for a similar action against the social host. 6 In the absence of a civil damages
act, if a vendor is negligent in his sales, he should be liable to those injured.
Likewise if a social host is negligent, he should be liable for the resulting injury
to the innocent third party.
The California Supreme Court in Vesely v. Sager," in dealing with the
question of the common law liability of a vendor decided that the central issue is
not one of proximate cause, but rather one of duty. The court stated that the
standard of care required may be found in a prohibitory statute which does not
impose civil liability. 8 If the statute was enacted to protect the general public
from personal injuries and property damage by those to whom the sale or furnishing of alcoholic beverages is prohibited, then a violation of the statute is also
a breach of a duty to the injured third party. 9 Notwithstanding the fact that
Vesely applied to a commercial vendor, the California Court of Appeals relied
on it to extend liability to a social host who served intoxicating liquor to a minor."
Clearly, the impeccable logic of Vesely impels the conclusion that any
person, whether he is in the business of dispensing alcoholic beverages or
not, who disregards the legislative mandate breaches a duty to anyone who is
injured as a result of the minor's intoxication and for whose benefit the
statute was enacted. If one willfully disobeys the law and
4 1 knowingly
furnishes liquor to a minor.., he must face the consequences.
32 Vesely v.Sager, 5 Cal. 3d 153, 159, 486 P.2d 151, 155, 95 Cal. Rptr. 623, 627 (1971).
33 Brockett v. Kitchen Boyd Motor Co., 24 Cal. App. 3d 87, 100 Cal. Rptr. 752, 753
(1972).
34 Colligan v.Cousar, 38 Ill. App. 2d 392, 187 N.E.2d 292 (1963); Elder v. Fisher, 247
Ind. 598, 217 N.E.2d 847 (1966); Pike v. George, 434 S.W.2d 626 (Ky. 1968); Adamian v.
Three Sons, Inc., 353 Mass. 498, 233 N.E.2d 18 (1968); Rappaport v.Nichols, 31 N.J. 188,
156 A.2d 1 (1959); Berkeley v. Park, 47 Misc. 2d 381, 262 N.Y.S. 2d 290 (1965); Jardine v.
Upper Darby Lodge No. 1973, 413 Pa. 626, 198 A.2d 550 '(1964); Mitchell v.Ketner, 54
Tenn. App. 656, 393 S.W.2d 755 (1965).
35 Harem v.Carson City Nugget, Inc., 85 Nev. 99, 450 P.2d 358, 359 (1969); Hall v.
Budagher, 76 N.M. 591, 417 P.2d 71, 74 (1966).
36 Carr v.Turner, 238 Ark. 889, 892, 385 S.W.2d 656, 658 (1965).
37 5 Cal. 3d 153, 486 P.2d 151, 95 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1971).
38 Id. at 164, 486 P.2d at 159, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 631.
39 See, id. at 165, 486 P.2d at 159-60, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 631-32.
40 Brockett v.Kitchen Boyd Motor Co., 24 Cal. App. 3d 87, 100 Cal. Rptr. 752 (1972).
41

Id. at -,

100 Cal. Rptr. at 756.
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Although the California Court of Appeals did not reach the question whether
in other situations a host at a social gathering might be liable for negligence as the
result of a violation of the prohibitory statute, the logic of Vesely indicates that
there would not be a different result.
42
In Wiener v. Gamma Phi Chapter of Alpha Tau Omega Fraternity
the
Oregon Supreme Court sustained a complaint against a fraternity which allegedly
served intoxicating liquor to a minor who later, while intoxicated, injured the
plaintiff. Once again a minor was involved, but the same reasoning could apply
to find a cause of action against any other social host who had breached a duty.
The court stated its theory broadly:
The fraternity status as host and its direct involvement in serving the liquor
to Blair are sufficient to raise a duty . . . to refuse to serve alcohol to a
guest when it would be unreasonable under the circumstances to permit
43
him to drink.
Thus there are states allowing a cause of action by an injured third party based
on common law negligence of the furnisher of intoxicating liquor whether the
furnisher is a vendor or a social host. While these courts have found a cause of
action against the social host who has furnished intoxicating liquor to a minor,
it is only a matter of time until the action is allowed against any social host.
In 1970 in the United States 54,800 people lost their lives as the result of
motor vehicle accidents.4 Of those 983 were in Minnesota45 and at least one-half
of all of these deaths were caused by the excessive consumption of alcohol."6
These alarming statistics may have been given some consideration by the Minnesota Supreme Court in the Ross decision. Notwithstanding these statistics and
the need to reduce the number of intoxicated drivers, the liability without regard
to fault standard should not be imposed on the social host.
The dramshop act, with its strict liability standard, should be applied
exclusively against those who treat the expense of insuring against such liability
as a cost of doing business. The social host should be liable for injuries to a third
party caused as a result of his deviation from a standard of care, but he should
not be held to the strict liability standard required by the Minnesota Dramshop
Act.
Chester D. Longenecker

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW -

ABORTION STATUTE DEFINING "JUSTIFIABLE ABORTIONAL ACT" NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL - CONSTITUTION DOES NOT CONFER OR
REQUIRE LEGAL PERSONALITY FOR UNBORN - WHETHER LAw SHOULD ACCORD
LEGAL PERSONALITY IS POLICY QUESTION

42
43
44
45
46

To

Ore. , 485 P.2d 18 (1971).
Id. at , 485 P.2d at 23.
Txs WoRLD ALmANAC 88 (L. Long ed. 1972).
Id. at 96.
Id. at 58.

BE DETERMINED BY LEGISLA-
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In 1970, the plaintiff was appointed guardian ad litem for all unborn
children awaiting abortion in the New York City public hospitals. Thereupon
the plaintiff brought an action against the New York City Health and Hospitals
Corporation in the New York Supreme Court for a declaratory judgment to
have the 1970 New York abortion "liberalization" statute' declared unconstitutional. The plaintiff asserted that the statute was violative of the equal protection and due process clauses of the fourteenth amendment, and that its application would constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the eighth amendment. Plaintiff obtained a temporary injunction at Special Term to restrain
defendants from "performing any abortional acts" unless the mother's life was
endangered. On appeal, the Appellate Division reversed, vacated the injunction,
and remanded to Special Term to enter a declaratory judgment sustaining the
validity of the statute as a constitutional exercise of legislative power.2 This
decision was directly appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, where the
issue was whether children in embryo are and must be recognized as legal
"persons" entitled under the Federal Constitution to a right to life. The court
held: the Constitution does not confer or require legal personality for the unborn;
the legislature may, in its discretion, classify unborn children so as not to confer
legal personality upon them. Byrn v. New York City Health & Hospitals Corp.,
31 N.Y.2d 194, 286 N.E.2d 887, 335 N.Y.S.2d 390 (1972).
This marks the first action attacking an abortion statute in which unborn
infants have been made parties to the action as a class, directly insisting upon
their right to life in all instances except where their mothers' lives are endangered.
However, while conceding that unborn infants were living human beings, the
court, in holding that the legislature has the power to treat unborn children as
legal nonpersons, deprived them of the protection of the law until birth. This is
done, notwithstanding the admission that, upon conception, the fetus is independent in its genetic structure, autonomous in its development and character,
human, and unquestionably alive.'
TURE.*

* Subsequent to the writing of this article, the Supreme Court of the United States decided
Roe v. Wade, 41 U.S.L.W. 4213 (U.S. Jan. 22, 1973), aff'g 314 F. Supp. 1217 (N.D. Tex.
1970), and Doe v. Bolton, 41 U.S.L.W. 4233 (U.S. Jan. 22, 1973), aff'g 319 F. Supp. 1048
(N.D. Ga. 1970), declaring restrictive abortion statutes unconstitutional. The Court avoided
deciding whether the unborn child is a living human being, which was admitted as a fact in
Byrn. The Supreme Court concluded only that there is at least potential life in the womb,
but held that the unborn child is not a "person" within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment.

1 N.Y.

PENAL LAW

§ 125.05 (McKinney 1971).

3. "Justifiable abortional act." An abortional act is justifiable when committed
upon a female with her consent by a duly licensed physician acting (a) under a
reasonable belief that such is necessary to preserve her life, or, (b) within twentyfour weeks from the commencement of her pregnancy. A pregnant female's commission of an abortional act upon herself is justifiable when she acts upon the advice
of a duly licensed physician (1) that such act is necessary to preserve her life, or,
(2) within twenty-four weeks from the commencement of her pregnancy. The submission by a female to an abortional act is justifiable when she believes that it is
being committed by a duly licensed physician, acting under a reasonable belief that
such act is necessary to preserve her life, or, within twenty-four weeks from the
commencement of her pregnancy.
2 Byrn v. N.Y.C. Health & Hosp. Corp., 38 App. Div. 2d 316, 329 N.Y.S.2d 722 (1972).
3 31 N.Y.2d at 199, 286 N.E.2d at 888, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 392. In addition, the court
below stated that "New York courts have already acknowledged that . . . the child begins a
separate life from the moment of conception." (Citations omitted.) 38 App. Div. 2d at 324,
329 N.Y.S.2d at 729.
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The court concludes that there are "real issues in this litigation, but they
are not legal or justiciable. They are issues outside the law unless the Legislature
should provide otherwise."4 Noting, however, that the legislature's decision is
subject to the Constitution, the court summarily states that the Constitution does
not require that legal personality be conferred on the unborn. In so concluding,
the court undercuts a basic assumption of abortion opponents that once the
unborn child was recognized as a separate, living human being, constitutional
protection would be readily available to him.' As one opponent of abortion has
stated:
The critical issue is whether an abortion involves the destruction of a human
life. If one concedes that it does, then one can hardly support a proposal
to kill existing human beings to suit the convenience or comfort of others.6
However, while admitting that the unborn child has an independent human
life, the court upheld legislation that would sanction the taking of that life. In
accomplishing this, the court produced an opinion which has several basic shortcomings:
(1) the historical analysis of the legal status of the unborn is too quickly disregarded;
(2) the law is divorced from its foundations of natural justice;
(3) the crucial issue of constitutional interpretation is totally neglected; and
(4)the court's own emphasis on modem science is ignored.
HistoricalAnalysis
The rights of the unborn child have been traditionally recognized in property
law, and more recently, in tort law. In Byrn, the court noted this, but stressed
that these rights were confined to "narrow legal categories." ' In fact, however,
the property rights of the unborn child have received considerable attention in the
law. In 1941, a lower New York court, in In re Holthausen's Will, summed up
the law's progress:
It has been the uniform and unvarying decision of all common-law courts
in respect of estate matters for at least the past two hundred years that a
child en ventre sa mere is "born" and "alive" for all purposes for his
benefit."
4 31 N.Y.2d at 203, 286 N.E.2d at 890, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 395.

5 See, e.g., Byrn, Abortion-on-Demand: Whose Morality? 46 No=Ra DAME LAWYER 5
(1970); Noonan, Amendment of the Abortion Law: Relevant Data and Judicial Opinion, 15
CATH. LAW. 124 (1969); Brown, Recent Statutes and the Crime of Abortion, 16 LoYoLK L.
Rv.275 (1970)
6 Testimony of Charles E.Rice before New York Joint Legislative Committee on Health,

Albany, New York, Feb. 27, 1969.
7 31 N.Y.2d at 200, 286 N.E.2d at 888, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 392.
8 175 Misc. 1022, 1024, 26 N.Y.S.2d 140, 143 (1941) '(emphasis added).
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This sweeping statement renders questionable the characterization as "narrow" of those categories in which the unborn child's property rights have been
recognized. Nevertheless, the court in Byrn did not discuss In re Holthausen's
Will, but relied instead upon Endresz v. Friedberg to illustrate the "narrow"
property rights of the unborn. There it was stated:
In other words, even if, as science and theology teach, the child begins a
separate "life" from the moment of conception, it is clear that, "except
insofar as is necessary to protect the child's own rights," the law has never
considered the unborn foetus as having a separate "juridical existence" or
a legal personality or identity "until it sees the light of day." 9
There could hardly be one of "the child's own rights" more valuable to it
than the right to live." Since the law recognizes that unborn children have
property rights, it is illogical to withhold the most important of all rights, life
itself." Moreover, it should be noted that at the time Endresz was decided the
unborn child's right to life was in fact still protected by New York's previous
restrictive abortion law, which permitted abortions to be performed only in circumstances when a reasonable belief existed that the mother's life was endangered.' 2
In the law of torts, a child, if born alive, has been allowed recovery for
injuries sustained prior to birth.' New York courts have not, however, allowed
any recovery under New York's wrongful death statute if the child died before
birth. 4 In considering this precise issue, a majority of jurisdictions that have
considered the question have reached a conclusion contrary to that reached by
the New York courts.' In such states, where recovery for a stillborn child is
9 24 N.Y.2d 478, 485, 248 N.E.2d 901, 904, 301 N.Y.S.2d 65, 70 (1969).
10 "And what right is more inherent, and more sacrosanct, than that of the individual in
his possession and enjoyment of his life, his limbs and his body?" Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F.
Supp. 138, 142 (D.D.C. 1946).
11 Byrn v. N.Y.C. Health & Hosp. Corp., 31 N.Y.2d 194, 214, 286 N.E.2d 887, 897, 335
N.Y.S.2d 390, 404 (1972) (dissenting opinion, Scileppi, J.); see Note, The Law and the

Unborn Child: The Legal and Logical Inconsistencies, 46
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349, 369

(1971).
12 Prior to the 1970 amendment, the New York statute read:
3. "Justifiable abortional act." An abortional act is justifiable when committed upon a female by a duly licensed physician acting under a reasonable belief
that such is necessary to preserve the life of such female. A pregnant female's commission of an abortional act upon herself is justifiable when she acts upon the advice
of a duly licensed physician that such is necessary to preserve her life. The submission
by a female to an abortional act is justifiable when she believes that it is being committed by a duly licensed physician, and when she acts upon the advice of a duly
licensed physician that such is necessary to preserve her life.
N.Y. Penal Law § 125.05 (McKinney 1967), as amended, (Cure. Supp. 1971).
13 Woods v. Lancet, 303 N.Y. 349, 102 N.E.2d 691 (1951); Kelly v. Gregory, 282 App.
Div. 542, 125 N.Y.S.2d 696 (1953).
14 Endresz v. Friedberg, 24 N.Y.2d 478, 248 N.E.2d 901, 301 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1969).
15 Connecticut: Hatala v. Markiewicz, 26 Conn. Supp. 358, 224 A.2d 406 (1966); Gorke v.
LeClerc, 23 Conn. Supp. 256, 181 A.2d 448 (1962); Delaware: Worgan v. Greggo & Ferrara,
Inc., 50 Del. 258, 128 A.2d 557 (1956); District of Columbia: Simmons v. Howard University
323 F. Supp. 529 (D.D.C. 1971); Georgia: Porter v. Lassiter, 91 Ga. App. 712, 87 S.E.2d 100
(1955); Indiana: Britt v. Sears, Ind. App. -,
277 N.E.2d 20 (1971); Kansas: Hale
v. Manion, 189 Kan. 143, 368 P.2d 1 (1962); Kentucky: Rice v. Rizk, 453 S.W.2d 732 (Ky.
1970); Orange v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 443 S.W.2d 650 (Ky. 1969); Mitchell v.
Couch, 285 S.W.2d 901 (Ky. 1955); Louisiana: Valence v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 50
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allowed under a wrongful death statute, logic would call for the prohibition of
abortion also; for if the death of an unborn child is culpable when negligently
caused, then the purposeful killing of such a child would be no less wrongful.
Even where recovery is denied, as in New York, the reason given for denial
does not support liberalized abortion legislation. Generally a wrongful death
statute is enacted for the benefit of survivors of the deceased, and the parents of
a stillborn child already have adequate remedies available through an action for
the mother's injury, in which the stillbirth is taken into account. 6 Abortion

prohibitions, on the other hand, directly benefit the child, and without such
protection, he has no other recourse to prevent the deliberate taking of his life

before birth."
After concluding that unborn children do have "narrow" legal rights, the
court in Byrn makes the principal point of its historical analysis when it states
that "unborn children have never been recognized as persons in the law in the
whole sense.""' The decision in In re Holthausen's Will and the judicial recogni-

tion of modern scientific advances would now appear to require that unborn
children be recognized as persons in the law "in the whole sense."' 9 For it is clear

that "[s]tare decisis does not, of course, compel us to perpetuate an unjust rule
'out of tune with the life about us.' "20
If the court in Byrn had decided that the legal personhood of unborn
children, even if previously denied, was now fully warranted by modern scientific
knowledge, it would have been consistent with the earlier reasoning of a cele-

So. 2d 847 (La. App. 1951); Cooper v. Blanck, 39 So. 2d 352 (La. App. 1923) *(dictum);
Maryland: State ex rel. Odham v. Sherman, 234 Md. 179, 198 A.2d 71 (1964); Michigan:
O'Neill v. Morse, 385 Mich. 130, 188 N.W.2d 785 (1971); Minnesota: Verkennes v. Corniea,
229 Minn. 365, 38 N.W.2d 838 (1949); Mississippi: Rainey v. Horn, 221 Miss. 269, 72 So. 2d
434 (1954); Nevada: White v. Yup, 85 Nev. 527, 458 P.2d 617 '(1969); New Hampshire:
Poliquin v. MacDonald, 101 N.H. 104, 135 A.2d 249 (1957); Ohio: Stidam v. Ashmore, 109
Ohio App. 431, 167 N.E.2d 106 (1959); South Carolina: Fowler v. Woodward, 244 S.C. 608,
138 S.E.2d 42 (1964); West Virginia: Baldwin v. Butcher, 184 S.E.2d 428 (W. Va. 1971);
Panagopoulous v. Martin, 295 F. Supp. 220 (S.D. W.Va. 1969) (applying West Virginia law);
Wisconsin: Kwaterski v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Inc. Co., 34 Wis. 2d 14, 148 N.W.2d 107
(1967).
Twelve jurisdictions agree with the result reached by the New York courts: California:
Bayer v. Suttle, 23 Cal. App. 3d 361, 100 Cal. Rptr. 212 (1972); Norman v. Murphy, 124
Cal. App. 2d 95, 268 P.2d 178 (1954); Florida: Stokes v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 213 So. 2d
695 (Fla. 1968); Illinois: Rapp v. Hiemenz, 107 Ill.
App. 2d 382, 246 N.E.2d 77 '(1969);
Iowa: McKillip v. Zimmerman, 191 N.W.2d 706 (Iowa 1971); Massachusetts:Keyes v. Constr.
Service, Inc., 340 Mass. 633, 165 N.E.2d 912 (1960); Nebraska: Drabbels v. Skelly Oil Co.,
155 Neb. 17, 50 N.W. 2d 229 (1951); New fersey: Graf v. Taggert, 43 N.J. 303, 204 A.2d
140 (1964); North Carolina: Gay v. Thompson, 266 N.C. 394, 146 S.E.2d 425 (1966);
Oklahoma: Padillow v. Elrod, 424 P.2d 16 (Okla. 1967); Howell v. Rushing, 261 P.2d 217
(Okla. 1953); Pennsylvania: Marko v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 420 Pa. 124, 216 A.2d 502
(1966); Carroll v. Skloff, 415 Pa. 47, 202 A.2d 9 (1964); Tennessee: Durrett v. Owens, 212
Tenn. 614, 371 S.W.2d 433 (1963); Hogan v. McDaniel 204 Tenn. 235, 319 S.W.2d 221
(1958); Virginia: Lawrence v. Craven Tire Co., 210 Va. 138, 169 S.E.2d 440 (1969); see
Annot., 15 A.L.R.3d 992 (1967).
16 Endresz v. Friedberg, 24 N.Y.2d 478, 248 N.E.2d 901, 301 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1969).
17 Byrn v. N.Y.C. Health & Hosp. Corp., 38 App. Div. 2d 316, 325, 329 N.Y.S.2d 722,
730 (1972).
18 31 N.Y.2d at 200, 286 N.E.2d at 888, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 392 (emphasis added).
19 See, e.g., Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946); Woods v. Lancet, 303
N.Y. 349, 102 N.E.2d 691 '(1951); Kelly v. Gregory, 282 App. Div. 542, 125 N.Y.S.2d 696

(1953).
20 Endresz v. Friedberg, 24 N.Y.2d 478, 488, 248 N.E.2d 901, 906, 301 N.Y.S.2d 65, 73
(1969).
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brated tort case, Bonbrest v.Kotz.21 There the infant plaintiff recovered in a
medical malpractice suit for injuries sustained while in the process of being
removed from his mother's womb, the court holding that "[t]he law is presumed
to keep pace with the sciences and medical science certainly has made
progress .... 22
The Bonbrest rule concerned prenatal injury to a viable child; it was later
extended to prenatal injuries to nonviable children in Kelly v.Gregory, which
also held that:
We ought to be safe in this respect in saying that legal separability
should begin where there is biological separability. We know something
more of the actual process of conception and foetal development now than
when some of the common law cases were decided; and what we know
makes it possible to demonstrate that separability begins at conception....
The complaint here, in alleging that plaintiff was in being in the third
month of his mother's pregnancy, alleges a conclusion
of fact consistent with
23
generally accepted knowledge of the process.
The court in Byrn, at first glance, seemed ready to follow this line of reasoning,
and uphold the unborn child's right to life. Instead, after deemphasizing the
value of precedent and reaffirming the importance of medical knowledge, the
court shifts its attention to its attempt to explain how abortion can continue to
be legally justified.
Natural Justice
The theory of natural justice has as its initial premise the principle that the
legal order necessarily corresponds to the natural order.24 An exposition of this
principle can be found in Calderv. Bull, an early Supreme Court decision:
I cannot subscribe to the omnipotence of a state legislature, or that it is
absolute and without control; although its authority should not be expressly
restrained by the constitution, or fundamental law of the state. . .. To
maintain that our federal or state legislature possesses such powers, if they
had not been expressly restrained, would.., be a political heresy, altogether
inadmissible in our free republican governments.25
In New York initial support for the opposite view can be found in Bertholf
v. O'Reilly, which discussed the validity of the 1873 New York "Civil Damage
Act":
The question whether the act under consideration is a valid exercise of
legislative power is to be determined solely by reference to constitutional
restraints and prohibitions. The legislative power has no other limitation.
... The theory that laws may be declared void when deemed to be opposed to natural justice and equity, although they do not violate any con21
22
23
24
25

65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946).
Id. at 143.
282 App. Div. 542, 543-44, 125 N.Y.S.2d 696, 697 (1953).
B. WRIGHT, JR., AmERICAN INTERPRETATIONS OF NATURAL LAW 280-306 (1931).
3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 387-89 (1798).
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stitutional provision, has some support in the dicta of learned judges, but
has not been approved, so far as we know, by an authoritative adjudication,
and is repudiated by numerous authorities. 26
In Byrn, the court relied upon Bertholf in refusing to adopt the principles of
natural justice:
It is not true, however, that the legal order necessarily corresponds to the
natural order....
...That the legislative action may be wise or unwise, even unjust and
violative of principles beyond the law, does not change the legal issue or how
it is to be resolved. The point is that it is a policy determination whether
legal personality27should attach and not a question of biological or "natural"
correspondence.
The court refused to take cognizance of more recent New York cases which
had adopted the view that natural justice exists as an independent measure of
the law. For example, in Endresz, the court held that the decision in Woods v.
Lancet2' "simply brought the common law of this State into accord with the
demand of natural justice which requires recognition of the legal right of every
human being to begin life unimpaired by physical or mental defects resulting
29
from the negligence of another."
If "natural justice" requires that the unborn child can recover for defects
negligently caused, should not the same "natural justice" require that there be
protection against the ultimate defect, death itself, when purposefully caused, as
in abortion? In any respect, it is clear that severe difficulty will inevitably be
encountered if an attempt is made to justify abortion in the face of biological
reality.
On the other hand, if the view of the law expressed in Bertholf is correct,
then the court's task in Byrn is a simple one: it can speak for the legislature in
saying, "Quod scripsi, scripsi-What I have written, I have written" (John
19:22). This is apparently what the court meant in finding that "[w]hen the
proposition [that the legal order does not correspond to the natural order] is
reduced to this simple form, the difficulty of the problem is lessened."'
Unfortunately, to simplify a problem is not necessarily to solve it."'
The court finally adopts the view that legal personality is a question solely
for legislative discretion, subject only to constitutional limitation. This result
mandates that future legislative resolutions be upheld, irrespective of any considerations of justice. The logical consequence of this position is that "valid law
is a merger of legislative and executive emotions, whims and hunches-an26
27
28
29
30
31

74 N.Y. 509, 514-15 (1878).
31 N.Y.2d at 201, 286 N.E.2d
303 N.Y.349, 102 N.E.2d 691
24 N.Y.2d at 483, 248 N.E.2d
31 N.Y.2d at 201, 286 N.E.2d

at 889, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 393.
(1951).
at 903, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 68-69 '(emphasis added).
at 889, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 393.

For instance, cutting down the incidence of crime is a worthwhile goal but it may
not be accomplished by discriminatorily mandating the sterilization of a particular
class of felons. Interracial strife is to be avoided, but not by the discriminatory
segregation of the races.
Byrn, supra note 5, at 26.
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nounced today and perhaps changed tomorrow. One's rights are never
.12
permanent ....
The assertion that the law is independent from standards of natural justice
is opposed to the principles upon which our entire legal system is founded, as
enunciated in the Supreme Court decision of Butchers' Union Co. v. Crescent
City Co.:
"We hold these truths to be self-evident"-that is so plain that their truth
is recognized upon their mere statement-"that all men are endowed"-not
by edicts of Emperors, or decrees of Parliament, or acts of Congress, but
"by their Creator with certain inalienable rights"-that is, rights which
cannot be bartered away, or given away, or taken away except in punishment of crime--"and that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness, and to secure these"-not grant them but secure them-"governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent
of the governed."33
In Byrn the "inalienable right" of life for literally thousands of human
beings depends upon the conferral of legal personality upon unborn children.
That issue should not be resolved apart from a permanent standard of justice and
wisdom.
ConstitutionalInterpretation
Although the court in Byrn divorced law from justice, it recognized that
policy decisions of the legislature must be tested according to constitutional
standards. It states, however, only that the granting of legal personality is "not a
question of biological or 'natural' correspondence," 3 and concludes that "[t]he
""
Constitution does not confer or require legal personality for the unborn ...
Since the court rejected natural justice as a criterion for determining the validity
of legislation, the constitutional issues deserved more of the court's attention than
such summary treatment. Even in Bertholf there is reassurance that measuring
legislation by the Constitution alone will still adequately protect fundamental
rights:
Indeed, under the broad and liberal interpretation now given to constitutional guaranties, there can be no violation of fundamental rights by legislation which will not fall within the express or implied prohibition and
restraints of the Constitution, and it is unnecessary to seek for principles
the Constitution, under which such legislation may be conoutside of
demned. 8
The United States Supreme Court has recently declared that the Constitution does not allow a legislature to distinguish arbitrarily between legal personality
and biological reality. In Glona v. American Guarantee Co., the Court con32 Byrn v. N.Y.C. Health & Hosp. Corp., 31 N.Y.2d 194, 209, 286 N.E.2d 887, 894, 335
N.Y.S.2d 390, 399 (1972) (dissenting opinion, Burke, J.).
33 111 U.S. 746, 756-57 (1884) (concurring opinion).
34 31 N.Y.2d at 201, 286 N.E.2d at 889, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 393.
35 Id. at 203, 286 N.E.2d at 890, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 395.
36 74 N.Y. at 515.
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sidered the rights of illegitimate children under Louisiana's wrongful death
statute:
To say that the test of equal protection should be the "legal" rather than
the biological relationship is to avoid the issue. For the Equal Protection
Clause necessarily limits the authority of a State to draw such "legal" lines
as it chooses.37
Similarly, In Levy v. Louiriana,the Court set forth the requirements for "personhood" under the equal protection clause:
We start from the premise that illegitimate children are not "nonpersons." They are humans, live, and have their being. They are clearly
"persons" within the meaning
of the Equal Protection Clause of the
38
Fourteenth Amendment.
Being human, alive, and in being are all characteristics of unborn children
which the court in Byrn concedes. Since under the tests enunciated in Glona
and Levy the unborn child would be considered a person within the meaning of
the fourteenth amendment, it remains to be considered whether the New York
abortion statute would violate his equal protection rights.
Relevant here is the Supreme Court's statement in Levy:
While a State has broad power when it comes to making classifications,
it may not draw a line which constitutes an invidious discrimination against
a particular class. Though the test has been variously stated, the end result
is whether the line drawn is a rational one.3 9
Under the New York statute, the unborn child's life may be ended anytime during
the first six months of pregnancy; 4" the motives of the mother in having the
abortion are completely irrelevant. Consequently, unborn children, as a class,
may be killed for reasons which would not legally justify the killing of human
beings already born. It may have been rational to draw the line at three months
before birth when the fetus was thought to be only a part of his mother, but,
as the court in Byrn acknowledged, human life is now known to begin upon con4
ception. Since "birth is but a convenient landmark in a continuous process,"2 '
it is no longer rational to maintain any distinction between born and unborn
children as regards legal personhood. This is especially true in light of the increasingly broad interpretation given to the fourteenth amendment:
From its original intent to safeguard Negroes against discrimination by
Whites, the fourteenth amendment has evolved into a broad guarantee of
equality both to artificial persons and to all natural persons irrespective of

37 391 U.S. 73, 75-76 (1968).
38 391 U.S. 68, 70 (1968).
39
40
41

Id. at 71 (citations omitted).
Supra note 1.
B. PATTEN, FOUNDATIONS OF EMBRYOLOGY 3 (2d ed. 1964).
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citizenship, sex or race. In an era of increased sensitivity to human rights,
it would be the ultimate in irony if the corporation which manufactures the
instruments used to abort the unborn human child was entitled, as an
artificial person, to equal protection of the law, while the unborn child,
who
42
is in all respects qualitatively human, is deprived of that protection.
Although the Supreme Court, in applying the equal protection clause to
social and economic legislation, has given "great latitude to the legislature in
making classifications .... [it has] been extremely sensitive when it comes to
basic civil rights and [has] not hesitated to strike down an invidious classification
even though it had history and tradition on its side."4 There is no civil right
more basic than the right to life itself, and any statute which deprives a whole
class of human beings of that right on an irrational basis ought to be struck
down.
The court in Byrn was not without recent examples of how constitutional
standards may be applied to determine the validity of abortion legislation, for in
several states restrictive abortion statutes have been attacked in the courts as
unconstitutional on various grounds. In Steinberg v. Brown," for example, the
restrictive abortion statute of Ohio was held not to be unconstitutionally vague,
nor a violation of the mother's right of privacy, of the equal protection clause, or
of the cruel and unusual punishment prohibition. The district court recognized
that, upon conception, a new life has begun. On this basis, the court held that
"[o]nce human life has commenced, the constitutional protections found in the
Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments impose upon the state the duty of safeguard45
ing it.")
The Supreme Court of Missouri has upheld that state's restrictive abortion
statute, holding that it was not unconstitutionally vague, that it did not violate
rights of privacy, equal protecion of the laws or due process of law, and that it
did not constitute an establishment of religion. The court concluded:
[UJnborn children have all the qualities and attributes of adult human
persons differing only in age or maturity....
The United States Supreme Court has . . . generally expressed its
disapproval of the practice of putting to death persons who, some would
argue, had forfeited their right to live. We believe
we must anticipate at
4
least equal solicitude for the lives of innocents.
On the other hand, the restrictive abortion statutes of Texas and Georgia

42

Byrn, supra note 5, at 27; see also II B.

SCHWARTZ,

A COMMENTARY ON THE CONSTI-

TUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 490-93 (1968).

43
44

Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 71 (1968).
321 F. Supp. 741 (N.D. Ohio 1970).

45 Id. at 746-47.
46 Rodgers v. Danforth, No. 57105 (Sup. Ct. Mo., Oct. 3, 1972).

The Missouri court

cited Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 '(1972), in which the United States Supreme Court
declared the death penalty unconstitutional as cruel and unusual punishment under the given
circumstances.
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have been declared unconstitutional.47 In Roe v. Wade,48 for example, the court
stated that such a statute deprived single women and married couples of their
right, secured by the ninth amendment, to choose whether to have children.
In another context, the right of the unborn child to equal protection of the
laws has been reaffirmed in cases not involving the issue of a statute's validity
under the Constitution. Especially significant are those cases where pregnant
women, for religious reasons, have refused medical treatment necessary to preserve
the lives of their unborn children. In each case it has been held that, since unborn children are entitled to the law's protection, the medical treatment should
have been given. 9 In Application of the President & Directors of Georgetown
College, the rationale for this rule was stated:
The state, as parenspatriae, will not allow a parent to abandon a child, and
so it should not allow this most ultimate of voluntary abandonments. The
patient had a responsibility to the community to care for her infant.50
The constitutional implications of these holdings are clear:
The law has protected the life of the unborn child against the assertion of
such a fundamental constitutional right as the freedom of religion. Undoubtedly, the reason is that the law has recognized a countervailing constitutional right belonging to the unborn child.51
Government failure to protect a class in its civil rights has also been found
in itself to be an unconstitutional denial of those rights. For example, in Lynch
v. United States it was held that "[t]here was a time when the denial of equal
protection of the laws was confined to affirmative acts, but the law now is that
culpable official inaction may also constitute a denial of equal protection." 2 By
applying this rationale to the liberalized abortion statute in Byrn, it is clear that
the removal of the protection of the criminal law from the unborn child would
be in itself an unconstitutional act."
Supporting Authorities
In the resolution of the issue of whether an unborn child should be accorded
the status of a legal person in the whole sense, both attacks upon and defenses
of the liberalized abortion statute must be determined in accordance with modern
scientific developments. 4 In Byrn, however, the court failed to discuss either
47 Roe v. Wade, 314 F. Supp. 1217 (N.D. Tex. 1970); Doe v. Bolton, 319 F. Supp. 1048
(N.D. Ga. 1970).
48 314 F. Supp. 1217 (N.D. Tex. 1970).
49 Application of President & Directors of Georgetown Col., 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir.
1964), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964); Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Mem. Hosp. v. Anderson, 42 NJ. 421, 201 A.2d 537 (1964), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 985 (1964).
50 331 F.2d 1000, 1008 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
51 Note, The Law and the Unborn Child: The Legal and Logical Inconsistencies, 46
NOTRE DAm LAIMR 349, 362 (1971).
52 189 F.2d 476, 479 (5th Cir. 1951).
53 Noonan, supra note 5, at 129-30.
54 Byrn v. N.Y.C. Health & Hosps. Corp., 31 N.Y.2d 194, 200, 286 N.E.2d 887, 889, 335
N.Y.S.2d 390, 392 (1972).
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the legal or constitutional implications of its decision to refuse legal personality
to the unborn-recognized in modern science as separate, living human beings.
Instead, the court takes a jurisprudential approach, ignoring modem scientific
developments.
The court cites the works of John Chipman Gray5 with approval, notwithstanding the fact that his approach is founded on outdated information. A
logical extension of his views taking modern scientific knowledge into account,
would most likely accord legal personality to the unborn child. For he believed
that "[i]ncluded in human beings, normal and abnormal, as legal persons, are all
living beings having a human form."" The court in Byrn recognized the unborn
child as being both "alive" and "human." By Gray's standards, then, the unborn
child would be a "legal person."
Byrn's reference to the works of George W. Paton57 merits more careful
analysis, for his statement is directly relevant:
Most systems lay down the rule that, in cases where legal personality
is granted to human beings, personality begins at birth and ends with
death.... [T]he child in the womb is not a legal personality and can have
no rights.58
The unborn child is regarded as already born in the civil law for all matters
affecting the child's interests, and in English law for matters benefitting the child
after birth. 9 Although such treatment is labeled by Paton as a "fiction," this
term is not justified in light of modern knowledge. The life of the unborn child
is certainly something "affecting his interests," and its continuation is a "benefit"
without which he would be able to take no others. Such a "fiction" should, therefore, in all logic be preserved for the unborn child's protection.
Opportunities for "child destruction" are too numerous even with the
prohibition of abortion.6" If "child destruction" would be easily accomplished
when abortion was prohibited, the termination of such prohibition-which Byrn
accomplishes-would not be an improvement in the law. In fact, removal of restrictive abortion statutes effectively ends the only protection that the law has
provided for the unborn child.6
Conclusion
The Byrn decision acknowledges the unborn child to be a separate human
being in fact, but not a "person" in the eyes of the law for purposes of preserving
its life. The court in effect held that if the legislators consider the life of this
human being worth preserving, let them so provide by statute; otherwise there
is nothing in the law militating such protection. The court's analysis in coming
55
56

57
58
59
60
61

J.

GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW 27-64 (2d ed. 1921).
Id. at 38 (emphasis added).
G. PATON, A TExT-BooK OF JURISPRUDENCE 353-56 (3d ed. 1964).
Id. at 353-54.
See text accompanying notes 7-8 supra.
G. PATON, supra note 57, at 354.
See note 51 supra, at 365.
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to this holding is deficient in several significant respects: in its analysis of judicial
history, in its rejection of natural justice, in its neglect of constitutional interpretation, and in its disregard for modem scientific knowledge.
Strong logical and constitutional objections can be raised with respect to the
court's holding. Its failure to discuss these objections in any detail makes the
case important for what it does not say, rather than for what it does. In fact,
all that Byrn really does say is, "Quod scripsi, scripsi."
James A. Kearns

TORTS-FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT-SoNIC BOOM-CAUSE OF ACTION BASED
ON ABSOLUTE LIABILrrY NoT ACTIONABLE UNDER THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS

ACT.--The plaintiff, James Nelms, sought recovery for property damage allegedly
resulting from a sonic boom caused by California-based United States military
planes flying over North Carolina on a training mission. Nelms presented his
claim to the Air Force for payment as required by statute.' After an adverse
determination, he sued the United States in the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of North Carolina under the Federal Tort Claims Act
(FTCA) .2 That court entered summary judgment for the Government based on
its determination that the power to authorize supersonic training flights was
within the exercise of a discretionary function, and thus expressly excluded from
coverage of the FTCA.' On appeal, the Court of Appeals vacated the summary
judgment and held that the discretionary function exception was not applicable,
Air Force regulations granted no discretion as to the amount of protection to be
afforded civilians during supersonic fflights.4 The court went on to say that even
though the plaintiff was unable to show negligence either in the planning or
operation of the flight, he could proceed with his action based on a theory of
absolute liability.5 Certiorari was granted by the Supreme Court and, in a 6-2
decision, the Court held: A cause of action under the FTCA cannot be grounded
solely on a theory of absolute liability. Laird u. Nelns, 406 U.S. 797 (1972).
Prior to the passage of the FTCA, liability for torts of the federal government was virtually nonexistent because of the doctrine of sovereign immunity
which had been accepted by the Supreme Court at an early stage.e After nearly
twenty years of debate, the FTCA was enacted as part of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946.'
The Act permitted the Government to be sued on recognized tort actions,
1 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) (1970).

2 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-80 (1970).
3 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1970) excludes from the coverage of the FTCA: "Any claim

based upon an act or omission of an employee of the Government, exercising due care, in the
execution of a statute or regulation, whether or not such statute or regulation be valid, or based
upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function
or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not the
discretion involved be abused."
4

Nelms v. Laird, 442 F.2d 1163, 1165-67 (4th Cir. 1971).

5

Id. at 1167-68.

6

Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. '(6 Wheat.) 264, 411 (1821).

7

Act of Aug. 2, 1946, ch. 753, tit. IV, 60 Stat. 812.
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certain torts being specifically excluded. It was left to the federal courts to
determine whether the law of the place of the occurrence recognized the cause of
action and having met that criterion, whether the specific tort complained of
was excepted from the Act. One of the early issues concerning the Act's coverage
was the application of absolute liability. In the early years following passage of
the Act a number of courts interpreted it so as to impose absolute liability upon
the Government if a private person would have been subject to the same liability
under the law of the place of the occurrence. In Boyce v. United States,8 the Government was sued for damage allegedly caused by blasting operations. Though
finding for the Government on the basis of the discretionary function exception,
the court stated that a recovery in some amount could have been allowed even
without a showing of negligence since the applicable state law made the actor
absolutely liable for any damage caused by blasting.' This logic was similarly
applied later in Parcell v. United States,'" and United States v. Gaidys," which
involved damage claims arising from the crash of Air Force planes on private
property. The courts in both cases concluded that the Government was absolutely
liable for the damage because a private person under state law would have been
absolutely liable.' Until 1953, the only case questioning the application of
absolute liability rules under the FTCA was United States v. Hull. 3 In that case,
a window at a post office counter had fallen on the plaintiff's hand for no apparent reason. Plaintiff sued on a theory of negligence, basing her case exclusively
on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. The court discussed the application of general tort law under the FTCA and stated that recovery for all common law torts
would not be allowed. As an example, the court used liability without fault for
injuries resulting from ultrahazardous activities stating that the United States has
only consented to be sued where there has been a negligent or wrongful act or
omission of some government employee.' 4
With lower court precedent supporting the proposition that absolute liability
could be a basis for recovery under the FTCA, the Supreme Court in 1953
decided the well-known case of Dalehite v. United States. 5 This case arose out of
the "Texas City Disaster" in which two shiploads of government-manufactured
ammonium nitrate fertilizer exploded in the harbor of Texas City killing over
500 people and leveling a large portion of the city. Dalehite was one of approximately three hundred cases brought against the Government seeking recovery
for wrongful death and property damage with aggregate claims totaling in excess
of $200 million. Dalehite was chosen as a test case with both sides stipulating
that the issue of government liability in all cases would be determined by the result
reached in that case." In discussing the decision of the Government to enter
8 93 F. Supp. 866 (S.D. Iowa 1950).
9 Id. at 868.
10 104 F. Supp. 110 (S.D. W.Va. 1951).
11 194 F.2d 762 (10th Cir. 1952).
12 Id. at 764-65. Parcell v. United States, 104 F. Supp. 110, 116 (S.D. W.Va. 1951).
13 195 F.2d 64 (1st Cir. 1952).
14 Id. at 67.
15 346 U.S. 15 (1953), aff'g sub nom. In re Texas City Disaster Litigation, 197 F.2d 771
(5th Cir. 1952).
16 In re Texas City Disaster Litigation, 197 F.2d 771, 772 (5th Cir. 1952).
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into the manufacture and shipment of dangerous fertilizer, the Supreme Court
focused primarily on the application of the discretionary function exception of
the FTCA. The decision to manufacture as well as all subsequent decisions at
the planning and operational levels was held to be discretionary.' At the end of
a lengthy opinion, the Court addressed itself to the issue of absolute liability under
the FTCA. Noting the statutory words "wrongful act," the Court concluded that
the FTCA applied primarily to the negligent acts of government employees, with
some brand of misfeasance or nonfeasance involving fault necessary to impose
liability. Since absolute liability is imposed regardless of fault, argued the Court,
it is not within the scope of the FTCA.' The determination of the absolute
liability question was not essential to the outcome of the decision and can be
characterized as dicta.
Nevertheless, Dalehite has necessarily been the starting point for any court
faced with the issue of entertaining a tort claim against the Government based
on a theory of absolute liability filed under the FTCA. All but one of the courts
of appeals which have dealt with the problem have adhered strictly to the determination made in Dalehite.9 The lone case opposing it is United States v.
Praylou2" decided by the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit less than a year
after Dalehitewas decided. Implementing an approach taken in the pre-Dalehite
cases, Chief Judge Parker held that the Government was absolutely liable for
ground damage caused by the crash of a government plane since a South Carolina
statute made a private person absolutely liable for any such damage. Although
the result reached in Praylou was contrary to the holding of Dalehite, the
Supreme Court declined to review the case."'
This conflict remained until Nelms was decided nineteen years later. Since
Nelms also arose in the fourth circuit, the Court of Appeals based its decision in
Nelms on its holding in Praylou and allowed the plaintiff to proceed against the
Government on a theory of absolute liability. While North Carolina had no
specific statute imposing absolute liability for damage caused by an airplane the
court found that the approach taken in sections 519 and 520 of the Restatement
of Torts22 had been adopted in North Carolina and that absolute liability could
be imposed for damage resulting from the carrying on of an ultrahazardous
activity. The court determined that supersonic training missions fell within the
17 Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 35-36 (1953).
18 Id. at 44-45.
19 Gowdy v. United States, 412 F.2d 525 (6th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 960
(1969); Wright v. United States, 404 F.2d 244 (7th Cir. 1968); United States v. Page, 350
F.2d 28 (10th Cir. 1965); Bartholomae Corp. v. United States, 253 F.2d 716 (9th Cir. 1957);
United States v. Ure, 225 F.2d 709 (9th Cir. 1955); Strangi v. United States, 211 F.2d 305
(5th Cir. 1954); Heale v. United States, 207 F.2d 414 (3rd Cir. 1953).
20 208 F.2d 291 (4th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 934 (1954).
21 Id.
22 Restatement of Torts §§ 519-20 (1938). MISCARRIAGE OF ULTRAHAZARDOUS ACTITIEs
ON. § 519. Except as stated in §§ 521-4, one who carries on an ultraCAREFULLY CARRI
hazardous activity is liable to another whose person, land or chattels the actor should recognize
as likely to be harmed by the unpreventable miscarriage of the activity for harm resulting
thereto from that which makes the activity ultrahazardous, although the utmost care is exercised
to prevent the harm. § 520 DEFINITION OF ULTRAHAZARDOUS AcTIvrrY. An activity is ultrahazardous if it (a) necessarily involves a risk of serious harm to the person, land or chattels
of others which cannot be eliminated by the exercise of the utmost care, and (b) is not a
matter of common usage.
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scope of the Restatement provisions" and vacated the trial court's summary
judgment in favor of the Government. Although Dalehite had been criticized
as too narrow an interpretation of governmental tort liability under the FTCA,"4
the Supreme Court in Nelms has apparently adhered to the former ruling. Relying
solely on Dalehite in its opinion, the Court held that a claim founded on absolute
liability could not be asserted under the Act, and since it was not within the
FTCA, the claim was barred by sovereign immunity. Any discussion of the
Nelms decision, therefore, necessarily involves discussion of the Dalehite case.
The pertinent parts of the FTCA regarding tort liability of the Government
read as follows:
[The] district courts ... shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on
claims against the United States, for money damages. .. for injury or loss
of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful
act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within
the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United
States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance
with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred. 5
The United States shall be liable, respecting the provisions of this title
relating to tort claims, in the same manner and to the same extent as a
private individual under like circumstances .... 26
It is evident from the statutes that the district court must look to the law of the
state in which the act occurred.2 7
The first inquiry of a court presented with a claim under the FTCA is
whether a private individual would be liable on the facts alleged. This is exactly
the procedure followed in Praylou, Nelms, and the pre-Dalehite cases which
allowed absolute liability. In each instance, the courts found that under state law,
absolute liability was imposed on the actor for damage resulting from the specific
conduct involved. In each case the court imposed liability on the Government
in the same manner and to the same extent as it would toward a private individual.
Why then did the Supreme Court in Dalehite and Nelms hold that no such
liability could be extended to the Government? Speaking for the majority, Justice
Rehnquist argued that the statutory words "negligent or wrongful act" apply
only to culpable conduct. Since the absolute liability theory requires no showing
of fault, he concluded that a claim based on absolute liability cannot be asserted
under the FTCA."8 This reasoning is identical to that used in Dalehite.
This interpretation of the FTCA is not necessarily correct in light of the
legislative history and purpose of the Act. The purpose of the FTCA was to
relieve Congress of the burdensome private bill device, which had been necessi23 Nelms v.Laird, 442 F.2d 1163, 1168-69 (4th Cir. 1971).
24 See Indian Towing Co. v.United States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955) and Rayonier, Inc. v.
United States, 352 U.S. 315 (1957).
25 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1970).
26 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1970).
27 Laird v.Nelms, 406 U.S. 797, 804 (1972) (dissenting opinion).
28 Id. at 798-99.
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tated by the doctrine of sovereign immunity, and to provide injured individuals
with a cause of action against the Government for torts committed by government
employees. 29 Attorney General Jackson, in a letter presented before the House
committee conducting hearings on the Act, remarked:
The continued immunity of the Government to suit on common-law torts
does not seem to be warranted either as a matter of principle or as a matter
of justice.30
Testifying before a Senate committee on the purpose and spirit of the Act,
Assistant Attorney General Holtzoff stated:
But the problem presented by this legislation involves a much larger principle. It involves the question of whether relief to a person who has been
injured by the tortious act of a Government agent shall be a matter of
grace or a matter of right. The underlying and basic idea upon which the
present bill is predicated is that, when a person is injured by an act of a
Government officer or employee by what would be considered a tortious act
if it had been committed by the agent of a private individual or a private
corporation, the injured party shall have the same right to sue the United
States as he would have had to sue the private individual or private corporation under similar circumstances.a3
The legislative history3" indicates that the Act was intended to be broad in
purpose and was not meant to gradually erode the doctrine of sovereign immunity. In Rayonier, Inc. u. United States, a case decided after Dalehite, Justice
Black stated for the Court:
The very purpose of the Tort Claims Act was to waive the Government's
traditional all-encompassing immunity from tort3 actions and to establish
novel and unprecedented governmental liability
Despite the broad purpose enunciated by the Court, the majority in Dalehite
held that the jurisdictional grant found in the phrase "negligent or wrongful act
or omission" could not be extended to include absolute liability. 4 This appears
contrary to the intent of Congress that the FTCA was meant to apply to other
areas in addition to the area of negligence. At one stage in its development, the
29 Hearings on H.R. 5373 and H.R. 6463 Before the House Committee on the Judiciary,
77th Cong., 2d Sess., at 29-30 (1942).
30 Hearings on H.R. 7236 Before Subcomm. No. 1 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
76th Cong., 3rd Sess., at 18 (1940).
31 Hearings on S. 2690 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 76th
Cong., 3rd Sess., at 34 (1940).
32 The hearings pertaining to the Federal Tort Claims Act will not be found in the
proceedings of the 79th Congress in which it was enacted. The following is a chronological
list of the hearings and reports relating to the Act: Hearings on H.R. 7236 Before Subcomm.
No. I of the House Comm. on the judiciary, 76th Cong., 3rd Sess. (1940); H.R. REP. No.
2428, 76th Cong., 3rd Sess. (1940); S. REP. No. 1196, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942); Hearings
on H.R. 5373 and H.R. 6463 Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 77th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1942); H.R. REP. No. 2245, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942); H.R. REP. No. 1287, 79th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1945); S. REP. No. 1400, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946).
33 352 U.S. 315, 319 (1957).
34 346 U.S. 15, 44-45 (1953).
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Act applied only to damage caused by the "negligent act" of a government
employee. The House, afraid that governmental liability under the act would be
too narrow, refused to adopt the Senate bill, but instead reinserted the wording
found in the present Act-"negligent or wrongful act." The report accompanying the House bill made these comments:
The Senate bill covers only claims arising out of "negligence" whereas the
recommended bill uses the phrase "negligent or wrongful act or omission."
The committee prefers its language as it would afford relief for certain acts
or omissions which may be wrongful but not necessarily negligent.3 5
It is dear then that the FTCA was meant to apply to cases other than those
based solely on a theory of negligence. In addition, it should be noted that the
Act contains a number of exceptions pertaining to specific substantive torts not
covered therein-actions based on absolute liability not being included among the
exceptions."
The thrust of the Court's argument in Dalehite was that absolute liability
was not encompassed under the heading of a "wrongful act" since absolute
liability may be imposed in the absence of fault. This reasoning gives too narrow
a meaning to the word wrongful and to the notion of fault. One may be legally
at fault if he is the cause of the damage regardless of whether he is morally
culpable. Absolute liability is not so much liability without fault as it is liability
without regard to the degree of care exercised by the actor. Absolute liability is
recognized as a basis for a tort action which may lead to liability; therefore, some
element of fault must exist. As one author has put it, there is conditional faultY
Until the conduct causes harm to another, the actor is free from liability but the
moment the conduct is the cause of harm, the actor is at fault and is responsible
for the damage even though the claim is predicated on a theory of absolute
liability. Any act which results in harm to another must necessarily be classified
as a wrongful act. Since absolute liability does involve fault in the broad sense,
an act giving rise to such liability is wrongful within the meaning of the FTCA.
The FTCA was designed to give private persons access to the courts which
were better equipped to handle the factual and legal issues involved in tort cases
than Congress which was equipped solely with the private bill device. In Dalehite
and Nelms, the Supreme Court has blinded itself to the purpose of the FTCA,
denying recovery against the Government on a theory of liability accepted by the
states and based as much on the fault concept as any other recognized mode of
recovery for damage. As one court of appeals stated in construing another
passage of the FTCA:
If the Tort Claims Act is to have the corpuscular vitality to cover anything
more than automobile accidents in which government officials were driving,
the federal courts must reject an absolutist interpretation of Dalehite .... s
35

H.R. REP. No. 2245, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1942).

37

Keeton, Conditional Fault In the Law of Torts, 72 HAv. L. REv. 401 (1959).

38

Smith v. United States, 375 F.2d 243, 246 (5th Cir. 1967).

36 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (h) excepts specific substantive torts: "Any claim arising out of
assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel,
slander, misrepresentation, deceit or interference with contract rights."

[Vol. 48:733]

CASE COMMENTS

In light of the ruling in Nelms, any possibility that absolute liability will be recognized as a basis of recovery under the FTCA would follow only if Congress takes
the steps necessary to amend the Act.
Richard M. Furgason
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DUE PROCESS-PREHEARNG SEIZURE OF PROPERTY
UNDER FLORIDA AND PENNSYLVANIA REPLEVIN STATUTES Is A TAKING OF

PROPERTY WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAw.-Appellant, Margarita Fuentes,
purchased a gas stove and later a stereo under conditional sales contracts from
the Firestone Tire and Rubber Company. The contracts provided that, in the
event of a default of any payment, the seller could, at its option, take back the
merchandise. The total cost of the merchandise was over $500 plus approximately $100 in finance charges. Under these contracts, Firestone retained a
security interest in the mechandise. With about $200 left to be paid, a dispute
developed over the servicing of the stove under the warranty. Mrs. Fuentes
stopped making payments under the contract. Firestone, pursuant to the Florida
replevin statute," submitted a complaint and affidavit in replevin in the Small
Claims Court of Dade County and posted a replevin bond. A writ of replevin
was issued immediately by the court and executed by a deputy sheriff. Mrs.
Fuentes then instituted an action in a federal district court, challenging the constitutionality of the Florida prejudgement replevin statute under the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment. She sought declaratory and injunctive relief
against continued enforcement of the procedural provisions of the statute authorizing prejudgement replevin. A three-judge district court upheld the validity of
the statute and judgement was entered for the defendant. Mrs. Fuentes appealed
directly to the Supreme Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1253' which authorizes such
appeals when injunctive relief is denied in an action considered by a three-judge
district court. The Supreme Court, in a 4-3 decision, reversed the district court
and held: Florida prejudgement replevin provisions work a deprivation of
property without due process of law insofar as they deny the right to a prior opportunity to be heard before goods are taken from their possessor.' Fuentes v.
Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
Replevin is a very ancient writ which has its origins in the Statute of Marlborough,4 enacted in 1267 A.D. Its original purpose was to protect tenants from
the abuses of their lords. The replevin writ was used to combat distraint, a process
by which the lords could seize and hold the tenant's property until any claims the
lord had against his tenant were satisfied. By obtaining a writ of replevin, the
tenant could have the sheriff take back the property from the lord. Today, the
replevin writ can be used whenever one person's property is wrongfully detained
I FLA. STAT. ANN. § 78.01 (Supp. 1972).
2 28 U.S.C. § 1253 "(1970).
Except as otherwise provided by law, any party may appeal to the Supreme Court
from an order granting or denying, after notice and hearing, an interlocutory or
permanent injunction in any civil action, suit or proceeding required by any act of
Congress to be heard or determined by a district court of three judges.
3 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1073 (1967). This statute was also declared unconstitutional
in a case consolidated with Fuentes.
4 52 Hen. 3, ch. 21 (1267).
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by another. It is principally relied upon by creditors seeking the return of goods
after there has been a default under a conditional sales contract.'
The Florida and Pennsylvania replevin statutes which were considered in
the present case are typical of most replevin statutes. In Florida, the replevin
action lies whenever goods have been wrongfully detained.6 The process is commenced by the filing of a bond for double the value of the property to be replevied. The writ of replevin is issued on condition that the plaintiff prosecute the
action in court without delay.' After the sheriff has seized the property, the
defendant in replevin has three days in which to file a counterbond equal to the
plaintiff's bond in order to have the property returned to him by the sheriff.'
The Pennsylvania procedure is substantially the same as that of Florida. Unlike
the latter statute, however, there is no requirement that an action ever be commenced in any court. The burden is on the defendant either to commence a court
action or to file a counterbond if he wishes to regain possession of the property.'
In this respect, Pennsylvania is typical of many states.
Prior to its decision in Fuentes, the Supreme Court had decided only one
other case involving replevin statutes. This was McKay v. Mclnnes, ° a 1929
one line per curiam decision upholding the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine."
The Maine court had set out three points in upholding replevin statutes. First,
any statute which had been in effect so long while remaining unchallenged is
presumed to be constitutional. Second, while the court granted that there was
a deprivation, it was temporary and conditioned upon success in a later court
action and therefore not within the protection of the fourteenth amendment.
Third, since a later hearing was possible at some time, there was a "process"
available and, therefore, there was "due process."
The Maine court's reasoning in Mclnnes has been eroded over the years by
subsequent Supreme Court cases.' The due process arguments of the Mclnnes
case were completely rejected, forty years later, in a Supreme Court case, Sniadach
v. Family Finance Corp.'s Although it involved the garnishment of wages and
not replevin statutes, Sniadach is the foundation for the Supreme Court's decision
in Fuentes. First, the court impliedly struck down Mclnnes' "blessing of age"
argument by striking down garnishment statutes which do not have provision for
a prior hearing and prior notice despite the fact that such statutes had been in
existence and had gone unchallenged for many years. Second, it was emphasized
that the property taken was the use of the garnished portion of the wages. 4 Even
though this deprivation was only temporary and conditioned on success in a
5 Comment, LaPrease and Fuentes: Replevin Reconsidered, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 886
(1971).
6 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 78.01 (Supp. 1972).
7 Id. § 78.07.
8 Id. § 78.13.
9 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, R. Civ. P. 1076 (1967).
10 279 U.S. 820 (1929).
11 McInnes v. McKay, 127 Me. 110, 141 A. 699 (1928), aff'd mem., 279 U.S. 820 (1929).
12 See United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946) (even a temporary taking of property
is protected by due process); and Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965) (the hearing
required by due process must be granted at a meaningful time).
13 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
14 Id. at 342 (Harlan, concurring).
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later court action, the use of property was held to be protected by the fourteenth
amendment. Third, the Court stated that for the requirement of a hearing to
have any meaning, it must be granted prior to the garnishment.
While all the arguments in favor of replevin were directly contradicted in
Sniadach, certain language in the majority opinion, which referred to wages as
"a specialized type of property presenting distinct problems in our economic
system,"'"5 caused some lower courts' to limit Sniadach to its facts: the garnishment of wages that as a practical matter, could drive a "wage earning family up
to the wall."'" Other courts, looking at the main thrust of the opinion, extended
the Sniadach holding to other property, such as bank accounts 8 and tenants'
possessions."
This due process rationale was expanded to prohibit the cancellation of
welfare benefits without some kind of notice and prior hearing in Goldberg v.
Kelly.2" Mr. Justice Brennan, speaking for the majority, said that in situations
where important determinations turn on questions of fact, due process requires
an opportunity to confront adverse witnesses.2 ' Again, however, the court laid
special emphasis on the type of property involved, noting that the termination of
welfare benefits pending a later determination of the controversy could deprive
a recipient "of the very means by which to live while he waits."'
2
Finally, in Boddie u. Connecticut,"
the Supreme Court indicated the scope
of the property interest protected by the fourteenth amendment:
That the hearing required by due process is subject to waiver, and is not
fixed in form does not affect its root requirement that an individual be
given an opportunity to be heard before he is deprived of any significant
property interest, except for extraordinary situations where some valid
governmental interest
is at stake that justifies postponing the hearing until
24
after the event.
In light of Sniadacl and its progeny, several lower courts have considered
the constitutionality of prejudgement replevin statutes. They have reached opposite conclusions. In Blair v. Pitchess, the California Supreme Court declared
unconstitutional California's Claim and Delivery law25 (replevin statute), which
provided for the seizing of property without notice or a prior hearing.2" In doing
so, the court relied heavily on Sniadach, Goldberg, and Boddie which, when
taken together, support the proposition that due process requires prior notice
and hearing before a person can be deprived of any significant property interest.
15 Id. at 340.
16 See, e.g., Brunswick Corp. v. J & P, Inc., 424 F.2d 100 (10th Cir. 1970).
17 395 U.S. at 341-42.
18 Jones Press v. Motor Travel Services, 286 Minn. 205, 176 N.W.2d 87 (1970); Larson
v. Fetherston, 44 Wis.2d 712, 172 N.W.2d 20 (1969).
19 Santiago v. McElroy, 319 F. Supp. 284 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
20 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
21 Id. at 269.
22 Id. at 264.
23 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (a denial of due process to refuse to allow indigent plaintiffs to
bring divorce actions because of their inability to pay a filing fee and publication costs).
24 Id. at 378-79, citing Sniadach and Goldberg.
25 CAL. Crv. Pxo. § 509 '(West 1954), repealed, Calif. Stats. 1972, ch. 855.
26 5 Cal. 3d 258, 277, 96 Cal. Rptr. 42, 55, 486 P.2d 1242, 1255 '(1971), noted in 47
NoTaR DAME LAYvEi 643 (1972); accord, LaPrease v. Raymours Furniture Co., 315 F. Supp.
716 (N.D.N.Y. 1970).
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The court held that the use of the property replevied was protected by the fourteenth amendment. While the court acknowledged that there are some situations
in which prehearing replevin can be justified, it concluded that the California
statute was too broadly drawn."
A different result was reached in Fuentes u. Faircloth," in which a threejudge federal district court upheld Florida's replevin statute. The district court
chose to limit Sniadach and Goldberg to their facts, holding in effect that the
Supreme Court had intended to pronounce a new constitutional rule for wages,'
welfare payments, and other necessities of life. Since the property here was not a
necessity, it was not protected by the fourteenth amendment. 0 This decision was
reversed by the Supreme Court in Fuentes v. Shevin. s '
In Fuentes, the Supreme Court held that replevin without prior notice and
hearing was a deprivation of property without due process of law. Mr. Justice
Stewart, speaking for the majority," delineated the issue as follows: "[Does]
procedural due process... [require] an opportunity for a hearing before the State
authorizes its agents to seize property in the possession of a person on the application of another?""3 In holding that it does, the court pointed out that the statutes
under review did not even require a sworn statement that the goods to be
replevied were wrongfully detained. In many instances, the court noted, one who
wishes to regain possession of replevied property must take the initiative and
institute a lawsuit himself. 4 In these instances, not only is there no opportunity
for a prior hearing, there is often no hearing at all.
The Court emphasized that the present replevin statutes bear little resemblance to the ancient writ from which they descended. Originally, the writ
was used by a tenant to force the return of property wrongfully taken by his lord.
The lord, however, could always stop this action of replevin by claiming to be
the owner of the goods. As the Court pointed out, the ancient writ of replevin
".... did not flow from an entirely ex parteprocess of pleading by the [tenant].""
The Florida and Pennsylvania statutes, on the contrary, provide for an ex parte
proceeding, without any kind of opportunity for the party in possession to be
heard.
The Fuentes Court noted that the opportunity to be heard must be granted
at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.3 " The Court concluded that
the right to a hearing only after replevin has taken place does not meet the
standard of meaningfulness: "If the right to notice and a hearing is to serve its
27 5 Cal. 3d at 277, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 55, 486 P.2d at 1255.
28 317 F. Supp. 954 (S.D. Fla 1970), revd sub -nom. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67
(1972).
29 Id. at 957; accord, Brunswick Corp. v. J & P, Inc., 424 F.2d 100 (10th Cir. 1970).
30 317 F. Supp. at 958; accord, Epps. v. Cortese, 326 F. Supp. 127 (E.D. Pa. 1971),
rev'd sub nom. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
31 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
32 This was a 4-to-3 decision. Justices Rehnquist and Powell took no part in the decision.
Mr. Justice White wrote a dissenting opinion in which the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice
Blackmun joined.
33 407 U.S. at 80.
34 For example, none of the appellants in Epps, the case consolidated with Fuentes, were
ever sued in any court. Id. at 72 n.4.
35 407 U.S. at 79.
36 Id. at 80, citing Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965).
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full purpose... it is clear that it must be granted at a time when the deprivation
can still be prevented."3 7 A wrong does not become permissible simply because
it can later be undone."
The form of the hearing depends on the nature and importance of the case
and the interests involved. While the Court refrained, as it had in the past, 9
from stating the form of the hearing that is required, it must be one sufficient to
determine the probable validity of the underlying claim against the alleged
debtor."°
Even though the deprivation is only temporary, and even though the
possessor does not have full title to the goods, his interest is protected by the
fourteenth amendment. The Court held that the due process clause protects even
a mere possessory interest and made it clear that Sniadach did not merely establish
a special constitutional rule for wages. 41
The Court conceded that property may be seized without a prior hearing in
"extraordinary situations."" Since the lower courts had disagreed as to whether
creditors' interests fell within such extraordinary situations, the Court listed in
detail the types of situations where the courts had properly allowed such seizures.
In the past, seizures without prior hearing had been used to protect the public
against bank failure;4" to meet the needs of a national war effort;" to protect
the public from misbranded drugs 45 or contaminated food. 46 In these cases,
prompt seizure was necessary to secure an important governmental or general
public interest. In each case the action was initiated by a government official
acting under a narrowly drawn statute indicating that the seizure was necessary
and proper. The Court in Fuentes, noted that the replevin statutes under consideration failed to meet these requirements. The replevin statutes were not
limited to special situations demanding prompt action. The statutes were not
narrowly drawn and they did not insure effective state control over state power.
The Court also considered the contention that Mrs. Fuentes had waived her
constitutional rights by signing a conditional sales contract containing a specific
provision authorizing repossession of the property on default. In response to this,
the Court noted that the purported waiver was contained in a printed form
contract, that this waiver was in small type, and that the appellant was not aware
of its existence. Additionally, there was no equal bargaining power between the
parties and in fact no bargaining at all concerning the waiver. To waive constitutional rights it must be shown that the waiver was voluntarily, knowingly, and
intelligently made.' Since no showing was made in Fuentes that this criteria had
been met, the court did not enforce the waivers in the sales contracts.
37 407 U.S. at 81.
38 Id. at 82.
39 Both in Sniadach and Goldberg the Court said that it would not detqrmine the form of
a hearing required by due process.
40 407 U.S. at 97.
41 Id. at 88, 90. "The Fourteenth Amendment speaks of 'property' generally."

42 Id. at 90.

43 Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245 (1947).
44 Central Trust Co. v. Garvan, 254 U.S. 554 (1921).
45 Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselbery, 339 U.S. 594 (1950).
46 North American Storage Co. v. Chicago, 211 U.S. 306 (1908).
47 Accord, D. H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174 "(1972) (upholding such a
waiver specifically bargained for in a commercial setting).
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In the wake of the Fuentes decision, the question arises as to how state legislatures can conform their own replevin statutes to due process requirements.
The California legislature's response to Blair v. Pitchess,48 which struck down
California's claim and delivery law, provides a possible model for other state
legislatures. California has amended its Code of Civil Procedure to allow the
courts, upon application of a replevin-plaintiff, to issue an order to the replevindefendant to appear and show cause why the specific property should not be taken
from him and given to the replevin-plaintiff.49 The hearing must be set for
a date within 10 days of the issuance of the order. If the defendant fails to appear, the plaintiff may apply to the court for a writ of possession.2' The statute
also permits the issuance of a writ of possession without prior hearing in certain
limited circumstances: (1) if probable cause appears that the defendant gained
possession of the property by theft; (2) if the property consists of negotiable instruments or credit cards; (3) if the property is perishable or is likely to perish
before a noticed hearing is possible; (4) the property is in immediate danger of
being destroyed, concealed, removed from the state, or sold to an innocent purchaser; (5) if the holder of the property has threatened to do any of the action
listed in part four above. 1 The judge may issue a temporary restraining order
forbidding any of the above actions if he believes such an order would be sufficient
to prevent such action.52 After a hearing has taken place, the court can order
disposition of the property pending the final outcome of the litigation."3 The
statute provides for the speedy completion of such hearings so that the determination of who is entitled to the property can be quickly made.' This legislation was
designed as a temporary experiment, set to expire on December 31, 1975." By
that time, it will be evident whether such a statute is practically feasible. Whether
it is constitutional in light of Fuentes is a question left to the courts. It will be
especially interesting to see whether the provisions allowing prehearing replevin
are within the Fuentes guidelines discussed above.
It is yet uncertain what the impact of Fuentes will be on other areas of the
law where prehearing seizure of property is still sanctioned. One of the most
common such remedies is prejudgement attachment. The California Supreme
56
Court in Randone v. Appellate Department,
has held California's prejudge5
ment attachment statute, " which permits the attachment of any property of the
defendant without prior hearing or notice on the filing of an action on an express
or implied contract for the payment of money, to be unconstitutional. In doing
so, the court followed the same rationale as the Supreme Court in Fuentes. In
light of Fuentes, the California court's opinion in Randone seems to be an ac-

48
49
50
51
52

5 Cal. 3d
CAL. Civ.
Id.
Id. § 510
Id. § 510

54
55
56
57

Id. § 520.
Id. § 521.
5 Cal. 3d 536, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709, 488 P.2d 13 (1971).
CAL. Civ. PRo. § 537 '(West 1954), repeated by Calif. Stats. 1972, ch. 550 § 1.

53

258, 96 Cal. Rptr. 42, 486 P.2d 1242 (1971).
PRo. § 510 (b) as enacted in Calif. Stats. 1972, ch. 855.
(c).
(d).

Id. § 510 (e).
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curate statement of the law. The validity of prejudgement attachment appears
to be in great doubt after Fuentes.
The California court distinguished foreign attachment statutes, however.
Foreign attachment is used to obtain quasi in rem jurisdiction over defendants
where in personam jurisdiction is not possible. These statutes often are the only
basis by which a state can give its citizens an effective remedy for injuries inflicted by nonresidents. This is such an important governmental interest that
foreign attachment statutes do not violate the Fuentes rule.
Another area of the law which may feel the impact of Fuentes is that of selfhelp repossession under the Uniform Commercial Code § 9-503. Prior to
Fuentes, several federal district courts considered UCC 9-503 and came to differing conclusions. In Oiler v. Bank of America,"s a federal district court sitting for
the Northern District of California never reached the substantive question, but
dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. In order for the court to have
subject matter jurisdiction over such a claim, the plaintiff must allege that he has
been deprived of a constitutionally protected right under color of state law.5"
Since the action was brought under the Civil Rights Act, there was no requirement that jurisdictional amount be in excess of $10,000. The court had
only to find "state action.""0 The court in Oiler was reluctant to find any
"state action" in self-help repossession, arguing that while self-help repossession
is specifically authorized by UCC 9-503, it had long been commonly accepted contractually based and judicially sanctioned practice prior to such
statutory authorization. 6 The court went on to say that not all action which
conforms to state law is "state action." Noting that state action is rarely found
where no state official had acted, the court listed the few exceptions: First, where
a state official has acted in concert with a private individual; 2 second, where
state law has compelled such action;63 third, where the power exercised was
purely statutory." Finding that self-help repossession fitted into none of these
categories, the court dismissed the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction."
A week earlier, the Federal District Court for the Southern District of California,
in Adams v. Egley,"6 reached the opposite conclusion on the same question and
determined that California's enactment of UCC 9-50367 did constitute state
action. In doing so, the court relied on a Supreme Court case, Reitman v.
58
59

342 F. Supp. 21 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).

60 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (3) (1970).

61 342 F. Supp. at 22.
62 Id. at 23, citing Shelly v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
63 Id. at 23, citing Harrison v. Murphy, 205 F. Supp. 449 (D. Del. 1962).
64 Id. at 23, citing Klim v. Jones, 315 F. Supp. 109 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
65 See also McCormick v. First Nat'l Bank of Miami, 322 F. Supp. 604 *(S.D. Fla. 1971),
which reached a similar conclusion. In finding no subject matter jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, the court relied on an older case which had held that § 1983 was only applicable
where personal constitutional rights were at stake, having no application to property rights.
This distinction was recently rejected by the Supreme Court in Lynch v. Household Finance
Corp., 405 U.S. 538 (1972). Also, in dicta, the court rejected the due process argument and
in doing so relied on its own previous opinion in Fuentes, which was subsequently reversed by
the Supreme Court.
66 338 F. Supp. 614 (S.D. Cal. 1972).
67 CAL. COMM. § 9503 (West 1964).
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Mulkey,"' which held that an amendment to the California constitution which
would prohibit the placing on any restrictions on a person's right to sell property
to whomever he pleases, and had the effect of repealing all of California's antidiscrimination in housing legislation, was an "encouragement" by state law of
private segregation and therefore unconstitutional. The district court in Adams
similarly found state action in that UCC § 9-503 had set up a state policy encouraging repossessions. The court concluded that when a creditor, on his own
and without any judicial process, repossesses property he is operating "under
color of state law" within the meaning of the Civil Rights Act. 69 "Even if an
independent right to repossess is created by the signed security agreement, that
right is created under authority of state law.""0 The court then determined that
UCC 9-503 was unconstitutional following the reasoning of the California
72
Supreme Court in Blair v. Pitchess7" and Randane v. Appellate Department.
The Oiler court distinguished Reitman v. Mulkey saying that that case dealt
with racial discrimination, that there was presented a compelling fact situation to
which much federal legislation was applicable, and that the historical, legal, and
moral considerations fundamental to extending federal jurisdiction to meet racial
injustice were not found in the self-help repossession situations. To date the conflict between Adams and Oler has not been resolved by the Ninth Circuit.
Finally, there is the question of the costs of Fuentes, both financial and social.
Replevin, by providing an efficient remedy for creditors, helps promote easy
credit. If the remedy of replevin becomes more expensive, creditors will take a
much closer look at credit applicants, and will probably raise interest rates and
prices to reflect the increased costs of repossession. Costs to low income consumers
are already high. Generally, retailers serving the low income market pay a
smaller percentage of their sales price for the goods they sell than do their counterparts serving the general market. Part of this extra profit is lost through the
present costs of repossession. Low income market retailers generally resort to
repossession much more often than do general market retailers. Still, the low
income market retailer's profit is significantly higher than that of the general
market retailer. 3
Increased cost of replevin would not drive the low income market retailers
out of business. They do a thriving business despite already high costs. If replevin
costs go up, they will raise their already inflated prices once more, safe in the
assurance that their market has nowhere else to go.
While the result in the Fuentes case is clearly mandated by the Supreme
Court's interpretation of the due process clause, it is equally clear that those who

68 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
69 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
70 338 F. Supp. at 618.
71 5 Cal. 3d 258, 96 Cal. Rptr. 42, 486 P.2d 1242 (1971) (California prehearing replevin
statute is unconstitutional).
72 5 Cal. 3d 536, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709, 488 P.2d 13 (1971) (California prehearing attachment statute is unconstitutional).
73 See Comment, Replevin: A Due Process Prescriptionfor an Ancient Writ, 45 TEMPLE

L.Q. 259, 266-7 (1972).
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are the supposed beneficiaries of due process could very well end up as its victims
through restricted credit, higher interest rates, and higher prices.
PatrickJ. Sullivan
CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW-FREEDOM

OF

RELIGION-AMIsH

PARENTS

NOT RE-

Yoder and Adin
Yutzy, members of the Old Order Amish Religion, and Wallace Miller, a member of the Conservative Amish Mennonite Church, were convicted in Green
County Court for their refusal to comply with the Wisconsin compulsory school
attendance law which requires all parents to enroll their children in either public
or private schools until they have attained sixteen years of age.' The respondents
defended on the ground that the tenets of their religion forbade the education of
children beyond the level of eighth grade, and that, therefore, to compel their
children's attendance at school would violate respondents' rights under the first
and fourteenth amendments. Thus, they claimed an exemption on religious
grounds from the compulsory school attendance law. Their convictions were affirmed by the Wisconsin Circuit Court. On appeal, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court, however, reversed the convictions and sustained on free exercise of religion
grounds respondents' asserted exemption from the compulsory school attendance
law.2
The United States Supreme Court granted the state's petition for a writ of
certiorari, and held: the state's interest in universal education is not totally immune from a balancing process when it impinges on certain fundamental rights
such as those protected by the free exercise clause of the first amendment and the
traditional interest of parents with respect to the religious upbringing of their
children. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
The Wisconsin Supreme Court's decision in Yoder marked the first significant victory for the Amish people in their protracted struggle to pierce the wall
of compulsory education that had been erected around them in one state after
another throughout this century.' In a series of decisions4 state courts had upheld
the contention of their respective state governments (or more precisely, their state
education departments) that the state possessed the authority to compel the
public high school attendance of Amish children even over the religiously motivated opposition of their parents.
In Commonwealth v. Beiler5 the Superior Court of Pennsylvania rejected the
claim raised by members of the Old Order Amish Religion challenging the state's
compulsory school attendance law as violative of the free exercise clause of the
first amendment as made applicable to the states by the due process clause of the
4 the Appellate Court of Ohio,
fourteenth amendment. In State u. Hershberger
confronted by a similar Amish-insiired challenge to that state's compulsory educaQUIRED TO ENROLL CHILDREN IN SECONDARY SCHOOL.-JOnas

1

Wrs. STAT. § 118.15

(1969).

2 State v. Yoder, 49 Wis.2d 430, 182 N.W.2d 539 '(1971).
3 Comment, The Amish and Compulsory School Attendance: Recent Developments,
1971 Wis. L. RFv. 832, 841 (1971).

4 Cases cited notes 5 & 6 infra.
5
6

168 Pa. Super. 462, 79 A.2d 134 (1951).
103 Ohio App. 188, 144 N.E.2d 693 (1955).
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tion law, arrived at a virtually identical result. Both decisions rested heavily upon
the now disfavored' thought-action distinction in first amendment interpretation
which forbade state restrictions on religious belief, but allowed state restrictions
on religions behavior.8 The concept of school attendance, the Beiler court
reasoned, fell obviously under the heading of behavior, and was thus manifestly
subject to reasonable regulation in the interests of public welfare.9
In 1967 the Supreme Court of Kansas delivered the decision State v.
0 in which the
Garber"
Court alluded extensively to the arguments adduced in
Beiler and adhered rigidly to the outmoded thought-action distinction; it rejected
the Amish defendant's claim that enforcement of the state's education requirement with respect to his daughter constituted an impermissible transgression upon
his first amendment right to freedom of religion. Garberis notable, among other
reasons, for its glaring failure either to employ a balancing of interests analysis,
or to recognize that recent trends in the law had swept past the antiquated and
artificial thought-action rule.1 Garber'smost striking flaw came in its refusal to
take judicial cognizance of the wholly pervasive nature of the Amish religion; it
blandly glossed over the fact that for the Amish education is fundamentally a
theological question of profoundly grave import for their very preservation as an
organized sect. The Kansas Supreme Court concluded that "the question of how
long a child should attend school is not a religious one."12
Dismissing an appeal from the Kansas court, the United States Supreme
Court summarily denied the petition for certiorari over the dissents of Mr. Chief
Justice Warren, Mr. Justice Douglas, and Mr. Justice Fortas, in effect letting
the Kansas decision stand."
This was the state of the law in 1971 when the Supreme Court announced
that it had granted Wisconsin's appeal of Yoder and would take a case of this
nature for the first time. Several considerations contributed to a nonfanciful
anxiety that the Yoder holding was in clear danger of reversal. 4 The very fact
that Yoder marked a sharp break with long-established precedent was in itself
a cause for concern on the part of the Amish. Moreover, in the context of the
Supreme Court's prior refusal in Garber to review a decision adverse to the
Amish, its willingness in Yoder to review the favorable result gave rise by natural
implication to a possible inference of judicial disfavor toward the Amish claim. 5
7 Cases cited note 11 infra.
8 The thought-action rule had its origin in Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145
(1878). The Supreme Court in Reynolds, upheld the bigamy conviction of a Mormon who
had taken a second wife in accord with the established doctrine of his church.
9 Commonwealth v. Beiler, 168 Pa. Super. 462, 469, 79 A.2d 134. 137 (1951).
10 197 Kan. 567, 419 P.2d 896 (1966).
11 See, Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); People v. Woody, 61 Cal.2d 716, 394
P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964). In Sherbert, the Supreme Court significantly broadened
free exercise coverage by upholding a Seventh Day Adventist's right to unemployment compensation despite her religiously motivated refusal to take employment. In Woody the California
Supreme Court extended first amendment protection to the use of peyote in the religious

rites of the American Indians belonging to the Native American Church. Neither decision is
reconcilable with the rationale of the thought-action rule.
12 State v. Garber, 197 Kan. 567, 574, 419 P.2d 896, 902 '(1966).
13 Garber v. Kansas, 389 U.S. 51 (1967).
14 Comment, The Amish and Compulsory School Attendance: Recent Developments,
1971 Wis. L. Rv.832, 847 (1971).
15 Id.
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In addition, the Wisconsin Supreme Court's opinion in Yoder, although a
model of the proper approach to the "balancing of interests" test requisite in
first amendment litigation, was open to legitimate criticism and was indeed taken
seriously to task for several well-grounded reasons.
Yoder is suspect on a number of substantive grounds, among them the
failure to classify compulsory education as a compelling state interest, the
failure to recognize and discuss the status and rights of Amish children, and
the uncomfortably broad test
established for granting exemption from man16
datory school attendance.
These flaws were of no little moment in light of the impending Supreme Court
review.
Finally, with the change of membership on the Court resulting from the
retirement of Chief Justice Warren and the resignation of Justice Fortas, only
Justice Douglas remained of the three justices willing to grant the Amish appeal
of Garberin 1967. Moreover, Warren and Fortas had been succeeded by Chief
Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun who were popularly thought to be more
generally predisposed toward the state's interests as against competing civil
liberties.' 7 Taken all together, this combination of factors could certainly have
led an Amish sympathizer to fear for the preservation of the Yoder rule.
As noted above, a skeptical Supreme Court might well have found a fatal
constitutional infirmity of Yoder to lie in any one of several possible flaws: the
refusal to recognize the compelling state interest; the sweeping overbreadth of
its exemption test; and the failure to consider juvenile rights. The first two of
these three points found their way into the separate opinion of Justice White;
the third became the nucleus of Justice Douglas' dissent.'
Such putative deficiencies to the contrary, the constitutional philosophy
employed by the Wisconsin Supreme Court prevailed. This philosophy long
central to the Anglo-American creed of limited government and fundamental
rights holds that "liberty and freedom consists in [persons'] having of government
those laws by which their life... may be most their own."20
In Wisconsin v. Yoder, the opinion for the Court was written by Mr. Chief
Justice Burger, and expressed the views of six of the justices; it sustained the
Wisconsin holding and with it the Amish parents' exemption claim. Chief
Justice Burger recognized forthrightly that it was the Court's responsibility to
strike the proper balance between the exercise of individual religious liberties and
the facilitation of legitimate governmental concerns. 2 Although the state's interest in universal education and its concomitant regulatory authority must be
respected, Pierce v. Society of Sisters" insists firmly that such an interest is never
16
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19
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Id.
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WORLD REPORT, April 27, 1970, at 22.
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 237 (1972).
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absolute to the exclusion or subordination of other constitutionally protected
interests.
In addition, a state regulation though neutral at first glance, may in its
localized application contravene the first amendment's prohibition of interference
with religion, and thus come within the reach of judicial interposition.2" Under
the doctrine of Meyer v.Nebraska,24 the courts must defer in the ordinary scheme
of things to a valid state interest, especially as formalized in proper implementations of legislative power; however, they must not defer when its operation
would have the inevitable result of chilling the exercise of basic first amendment
rights. These rights include the freedom of religion and also the traditional
panoply of parental rights in regard to the nurture and upbringing of children.
Furthermore, Sherbert v. Verner reiterated the constitutional presumption that
only interests of the highest order which cannot be otherwise served may supersede bona fide claims to the free exercise of religion."
Thus, a State's interest in universal education, however highly we rank
it, is not totally free from a balancing process when it impinges on other
fundamental rights and interests, such as those specifically protected by the
Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and the traditional interest
of parents with respect to the religious upbringing of their children ....26
The Amish adhere literally to St. Paul's injunction, "Be not conformed to
this world."2 In light of this theological principle, Amish teaching prohibits
higher learning on the ground that its inescapable effect is to develop values
that irresistibly tend to estrange man from his God. In light of the realities of
contemporary American life Amish teaching prohibits higher learning on the
further ground that it places Amish children in a hostile environment, separates
them from their community during the critically formative adolescent years, and
constitutes an impermissible exposure to worldly influence entirely in conflict
with their most cherished and deeply held beliefs.2" Such an exposure contains
within it the danger of unravelling the inextricably interwoven matrices of values
that underlie the Amish community and comprise the Amish way of life.29 Thus
the preservation of the Amish as an organized religion was more than merely
tangentially involved in the disposition of the case. In order for a state policy
requiring secondary school attendance to prevail over religiously inspired parental
opposition, there must perforce be a compelling state interest of sufficient magnitude to outweigh claims arising under the free exercise clause of the first amendment."° In view of its circumstances, Yoder set an even higher standard for the
Government to meet.
The Court held that the state's case did not meet the standard. Chief justice Burger could find no evidence in Yoder of such an overpowering state in23
24
25
26
27
28
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Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).

262 U.S. 390 (1923).

Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214 (1972).
Romans 12:2.
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 211 (1972).
Id. at 218.
Id. at 233.

[VCol. 48:741]

CASE COMMENTS

terest as to justify Wisconsin's claim that it was empowered, "as parens patriae,
to 'save' a child from himself or his Amish parents by requiring an additional
two years of compulsory formal high school education." 1 No proof had been
adduced to show that foregoing the last two years of compulsory education would
impair the children's mental or physical well-being or their eventual ability to
support themselves or would result, in any way, in the material debilitation of
American society. 2
Furthermore, the highly skilled vocational education that Amish children
receive at the hands of their elders satisfies the requirement of Pierce that parents
"prepare [them] for additional obligations,"3 " and hardly leaves them doomed
to dependency upon society should they ever decide to withdraw from Amish
life. No less preeminent an authority than Thomas Jefferson suggested that
"[alt the discharging of the pupils from the elementary schools, . . . those
destined for labor will engage in the business of agriculture or will enter into
apprenticeships to such handicraft art as may be their choice."3 4 In fact, Chief
Justice Burger could not see how the combination of formal education and vocational training provided for Amish children failed to satisfy the overall interests
that Wisconsin itself was advancing in support of its compulsory attendance
claim.3 5
Thus, the Court held that consistent with the first and fourteenth amendments a state could not constitutionally compel members of the Amish faith to
enroll their children in school beyond the eighth grade." Conversely, state recognition of such an exemption did not constitute an establishment of religion under
the first amendment for the reason that its purpose was not to favor or further
the Amish religion but merely to permit it to survive in an increasingly antagonistic world. To the Court the exemption policy reflected nothing more than
the constitutionally commanded neutrality of government toward all religions
and toward all religious differences.3 " As Chief Justice Warren strongly admonished in Braunfeld v. Brown,"a the courts must move with circumspection in performing their sensitive task of striking the delicate balance between the exercise
of religious liberties and the pursuit of governmental interests that they find competing in the field of first amendment litigation. In Yoder Chief Justice Burger
concluded that the balance had indeed been found and struck:
Aided by a history of three centuries as an identifiable religious sect
and a long history as a successful and self-sufficient segment of American
society, the Amish... have convincingly demonstrated the sincerity of their
religious beliefs, the interrelationship of belief with their mode of life, the
vital role which belief and daily conduct play in the continued survival of
31

Id. at 232.

32 Id. at 234.
33 Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925).
34 Jefferson, Letter to P. Carr, in THOMAS JEFFERSON AND
97 (C. Arrowood ed. 1930).
35 406 U.S. at 234.
36 Id.
37 Id. at 234-35 n.22.
38 366 U.S. 599, 605 (1961).
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Old Order Amish communities.., and the hazards presented by the State's
enforcement of a statute generally valid as to others.3 9
In his separate opinion, Justice White, speaking for Justices Brennan and
Stewart,4" concurred in the judgment but expressed marked reservations with
respect to the nature and impact of the Yoder holding. Mr. Justice White appeared to be drawing back from the breadth of the Burger majority opinion.
In particular, he seemed disquieted by the larger implications of the decision for
the future of American public education.
By stressing the weight that must be given to the presumption of validity
inherent in the state's concern for preserving minimal educational standards,4 '
Mr. Justice White emphasized the decision's limited scope and localized impact.
His opinion dwelt at some length upon the central position occupied by the institution of public education in contemporary American life. He turned to Mr.
Chief Justice Warren's opinion in Brown v. Board of Education" which stands
as a foremost authority for the proposition that education is perhaps the most
important of all the functions performed by state and local governments.
Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures for
education both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education
to our democratic society. It is required in the performance of our most
basic public responsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It is the very
foundation of good citizenship. 3
Only because the legitimate state interest in education was largely satisfied
by the eight years that Amish children spent in school, and because the potentially adverse effect of the state requirement upon Amish religious integrity was
feared to be great, was Justice White able to concur in the decision.44 Even at
that he thought Yoder still a "close" case. In contradistinction to Chief Justice
Burger's conclusion that the Amish right to freedom of religion commanded
precedence over the state's interest in universal education, Justice White concluded that it commanded precedence only over the controverted final two years
of universal education that Wisconsin law required. To this end he emphasized
that it would have been a very different case for him had the Amish parents
asserted "that their religion forbade their children from attending any school
at any time and from complying in any way with the educational standards set
by the State."4 Thus, Justice White also subjected the competing interests to
a weighing process, but with the difference that his balancing test had been performed on much more finely calibrated scales than that of Chief Justice Burger.
The apparent anomaly of a unanimous decision incorporating a dissent
arose with the opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas. Although he assented to the
39 406 U.S. at 235.
40 Of the seven justices participating in Yoder, only Mr. Justice Blackmun and Mr.
Justice Marshall gave unqualified assent to the Burger opinion for the Court.
41 406 U.S. at 239.
42 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
43 Id. at 493.
44 406 U.S. at 241.
45 Id. at 238.
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holding of the Court as regards respondent Yoder, Douglas dissented as to his
two fellow respondents, Yutzy and Miller, who would appear, at first glance, to
stand before the law in the same position as Yoder." The distinction that Justice
Douglas drew between the respective positions in which the respondents found
themselves before the law rested solely upon the issue of the rights of the children
involved."' He maintained this was an issue clearly central to the ultimate disposition of the case, but one to which the Court had not even addressed itself in
passing. The crucial difference in the outcomes lay in the fact that of the three
children upon whose education the entire controversy pivoted only Yoder's
daughter had actually testified in regard to her own deep religious scruples
against secondary learning. 8
Justice Douglas disagreed sharply with the Court's assumption that the
matter was within the dispensation of the parents alone. He rejected the majority's approach which he felt rested upon the presupposition "that the only interests at stake in the case are those of the Amish parents on the one hand, and
those of the State on the other."4 For all intents and purposes, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court had treated the free exercise of religion question that Yoder
posed in terms of an implicit identity of interest between the parent and the child.
All such implications aside, for Douglas the question of the child's right to
the free exercise of his religion along with his right to a higher education
demanded consideration of his own desires in the face of these potentially conflicting values. Moreover, the inexorable result of upholding the Amish parents'
exemption claim was the isolation of the children from exposure to the full contrariety of external influences present in a heterogenous and pluralistic society,
and the inculcation in the children, through parental preemption and governmental default, of the elders' conceptions of religious faith and moral duty."0
Justice Douglas alluded to Prince v. Massachusetts" where the narrow
question for decision concerned the adult's free exercise of his religion, although
the Court's analysis actually focused upon the strong state interest in the welfare
of the child. In Yoder, on the other hand, the imposition of the parents' religious
beliefs upon the child was an imposition resulting directly from the litigation
itself, and Douglas pointedly reminded the court that "[r]eligion is an individual
experience.""
In light of these legal and sociological realities, Douglas was unwilling to
permit this imposition of religious belief without a judicial determination of the
child's desires and possibly even an accession to his wishes. "[I]f an Amish child
desires to attend high school, and is mature enough to have that desire respected,
46 Id. at 243.
47 Id.
48

Id.

50

Id. at 245-46.

51

321 U.S. 158 (1944).

49 Id. at 241.
In Prince, the Supreme Court upheld the conviction of a

Jehovah's Witness who had violated a state statute prohibiting juvenile street solicitation by
furnishing her minor niece with religious literature to distribute qn the streets of Brockton.
The Court upheld the conviction even though it is a religious duty of Jehovah's Witnesses to
proselytize.
52 406 U.S. at 243.
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the State
may well be able to override the parents' religiously motivated objec53
tions.3
Mr. Justice Douglas perceived the juvenile rights that he would have upheld in Yoder as following consistently in a direct line of Supreme Court precedent firmly establishing the principle that young people have constitutionally
protectible interests that the states may not abridge. The Court had elevated into
a constitutional rule the precept that "[n]either the Bill of Rights nor the Fourteenth Amendment is for adults alone."'" Under this principle, the Court has
required first amendment protection for school children in civil cases,5 5 and
For Douglas,
sixth amendment protection for juveniles in criminal cases.5
Wisconsin v. Yoder called for nothing more than a natural and timely extension
of this trend.
In anticipation of the points raised by Justice Douglas' dissent, both the
Burger majority opinion and the brief Stewart concurrence explicitly stated that
the holding of the Court was posited to no degree upon the assertion of the religious interest of the parents as against that of the child.57 As that question was
not at all an issue in the case, the Court's opinion did not reach nor decide it;
on that subject Chief Justice Burger was careful to intimate no view. Nevertheless, his verbal formulation of the concept of state interposition between the conflicting desires of parents and child indicated deep reservations with Douglas'
contention should it ever arise directly for decision by the Court:5 8
It is clear that such an intrusion by a State into family decisions in the area
of religious training would give rise to grave questions of religious freedom
comparable to those raised here....59
Mr. Chief Justice Burger was explicit in limiting the Yoder holding only to
those persons professing a sincere and recognizable religious faith.60 Before
reaching its decision the Court had scrupulously ascertained that Amish theology
and the Amish mode of life were indeed inseparably intertwined.6 ' Such an
evaluation was crucial, for a way of life, however laudable and salutary, could
not be asserted to frustrate the indisputable state authority over universal education if it stood on wholly secular considerations.62 In order for it to secure the
protection of the first amendment, an exemption claim must have its source in
religious motivation.
Although a determination of what is a "religious" belief or practice entitled
to constitutional protection may present a most delicate question, the very
concept of ordered liberty precludes allowing every person to make his own
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62

Id. at 242.
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967).
Tinker v. Des Moines, 393 U.S. 503 (1968).
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
406 U.S. at 230, 237.
Id. at 231.
Id.
Id. at 215.
Id.
Id.

[Vol. 48:741]

CASE COMMENTS

standards on matters of conduct in which society as a whole has important
interests.63
The Court turned to the example of Henry David Thoreau to demonstrate a
life style ordered purely along subjective lines that would not have qualified for
an exemption under the first amendment.64 Claims based on philosophical and
personal, rather than theological values, failed to satisfy the requirements of the
freedom of religion clause.
Mr. Justice Douglas, however, lamented what he thought to be the Court's
retreat from the libertarian precedents of United States v. Seeger6 5 and Welsh
v. United States6 Seeger and Welsh both involved the selective service system,
and the Court held in both that conscientious objector status could not be automatically denied to persons whose opposition to war was philosophical rather
than religious in nature. In Douglas' view, the free exercise right of the first
amendment could not be conditioned solely upon theistically rooted systems of
belief nor limited only to those persons adhering to conventional religious faith.
If the Court had seen fit in Seeger to extend the exemption from military service
to nontheists, Justice Douglas could see no reason why an exemption from
secondary education should not be similarly extended.
The nontheist should
no more be precluded from claiming a bona fide exemption than should the religious dissenter; the proper test is whether he professes "[a] sincere and meaningful belief which occupies in the life of its possessor a place parallel to that filled
by the God of those admittedly qualifying for the exemption."6 " For his part,
Douglas reaffirmed this "exalted" conception of religion for which he could
find "no acceptable alternative."6 9
Mr. Chief Justice Burger, however, held firmly to the requirement that an
exemption claim must rest on established religious belief before the Court will
grant it legal recognition:
It cannot be over-emphasized that we are not dealing with a way of life
and mode of education by a group claiming to have recently discovered
some "progressive" or more enlightened process for rearing children for
modem life."
It appears inevitable that the Court will have to confront someday the
related questions not directly before it in Yoder: the validity of philosophical
rather than religious claims, the rights of the children involved, and the breadth
of the exemption in the face of strong state interest. Nevertheless, in Yoder the
Supreme Court significantly strengthened the first amendment's capacity to protect an individual's free exercise of his religion. In that sense alone, Wisconsin v.
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70

Id. at 215-16.
Id. at 216.
380 U.S. 163 (1965).
398 U.S. 333 (1970).
406 U.S. at 248.
United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 176 (1965).
406 U.S. at 249.
Id. at 235.
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Yoder represents a major step forward in the constitutional development of religious freedom.
Robert J. Seminara

INTERNATIONAL
EXCEPTION

-

LAW -

THE ACT OF

STATE DOCTRINE

-

THE

BERNSTEIN

WHEN THERE IS AN ASSURANCE FROM THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH

TO THE COURT THAT THE ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE WOULD NOT ADVANCE THE
INTEREST OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, THE DOCTRINE SHOULD NOT APPLY.

-In July of 1958, First National City Bank loaned $15 million to a predecessor
of the Banco Nacional de Cuba. The loan was secured by a pledge of United
States Government bonds. The loan was renewed the following year, and in

1960 $5 million was repaid, the $10 million balance was renewed for one year,
and collateral equal to the value of the portion repaid was released by First National City Bank.
Meanwhile, on January 1, 1959, the Castro government came to power in
Cuba. On September 16, 1960, the Cuban militia, pursuant to decrees of the
Castro government, seized all of the branches of the First National City Bank
located in Cuba. A week later the bank retaliated by selling the collateral securing the loan, and applying the proceeds of the sale to repayment of the principal
and unpaid interest. An excess of at least $1.8 million over and above principal
and unpaid interest was realized from the sale of the collateral. The Banco
Nacional de Cuba brought an action against First National City Bank to recover
this excess and the First National City Bank, by way of set-off and counterclaim,
asserted the right to recover damages for the expropriation of its property in
Cuba.'
The district court recognized that the decision in Banco Nacional de Cuba
v. Sabbatino,2 holding that the courts of one nation will not sit in judgment on
the acts of another nation within its own territory, would bar recovery on the
counterclaim. The court concluded, however, that Congressional enactments
since the Sabbatino decision had overruled that case.' There was a summary
judgment in favor of the First National City Bank on all issues except the amount
which could properly be applied to the loan by First National City Bank. The
parties stipulated that in any event the excess was less than the damages which
the First National City Bank could prove in support of its expropriation claim
if that claim were allowed. First National City Bank then waived any recovery
on its counterclaim over and above the amount recoverable by Banco Nacional
de Cuba on its complaint; the district court then rendered judgment dismissing
First National City Bank's counterclaim on the merits.4
The case was appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, and there it was held that the Congressional enactments relied upon by
1 First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759 (1972).
2 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 '(1964).
3 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. First National City Bank, 270 F. Supp. 1004, 1007
(S.D.N.Y. 1967); Hickenlooper Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1964, 22 U.S.C.
§ 2370 (e) (2) (1971).
4 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. First National City Bank, 270 F. Supp. 1004 (S.D.N.Y.
1967).
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the district court did not govern the case and that the decision in Sabbatino barred recovery by First National City Bank on its counterclaim.5 Certiorari was
granted and the judgment of the Court of Appeals was vacated for consideration
of the views of the Department of State, which had been furnished to the
Supreme Court following the filing of the petition for certiorari.6 Upon reconsideration, the Court of Appeals by a divided vote adhered to its earlier decision,
holding that the letter submitted to the court by the Department of State would
have no bearing on the case.' The Supreme Court again granted certiorari and
reversed with no majority opinion. First National City Bank u. Banco Nacional
de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759 (1972).
This case is not an isolated incident. For many years almost every country
in the world has been faced with the problem of how a domestic court in one
nation is to treat transfers of property that arise from the expropriation decrees
of foreign nations.' The dilemma became extremely troublesome to the United
States with the Castro government's seizure and nationalization of so many
American companies. The economic ties between the two countries had been
very strong with almost all significant investment in Cuba being held by American interests." The expropriation by the Cuban government of property owned
by United States citizens gave rise to the celebrated international law case of
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino'
In the Sabbatino case an American company had contracted to purchase a
shipment of sugar from a Cuban company principally owned by American nationals. Before the shipment was sent, the Cuban company was nationalized
and the American company set about negotiating with the nationalized company
for the same shipment. An agreement was reached between them and the shipment was sent to the American company. However, the American company did
not know whether to pay the nationalized company or its predecessor, the American-owned company. Suit was filed and Sabbatino was appointed receiver for
the Cuban company owned by American nationals while Banco Nacional de
Cuba represented the nationalized company. The issue arising from this case was
whether or not the proceeds of the shipment should be paid to the company
which had been nationalized without proper compensation to the American
owners. The Supreme Court held in a very unpopular decision that under the
"act of state" doctrine the United States Court could not sit in judgment on the
acts of the Castro government within Cuban territory. 1 The act of state doctrine
appears to have taken root in England as early as 1674.2 It began to emerge
in the jurisprudence of the United States in the late eighteenth century. 3 The
5

1970).

Banco Nacional de Cuba v. First National City Bank, 431 F.2d 394, 399 (2d Cir.

6 First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 400 U.S. 1019 (1971).
7 First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 442 F.2d 530 (2d Cir. 1971).
8 See, Testimony of N. Katzenbach, Attorney General of the United States, at the Hearings on the Foreign Assistance Act Before the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 89th Cong.,
1st Sess., pt. 8, at 1234-37 '(1965).

9 Id.

10 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).

11 Id.

12 Blad v. Bamfield, 3 Swans. 604, 36 Eng. Rep. 992, (1674).
13 See, The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 135-36 (1812).
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doctrine gained the recognition of the Supreme Court in Underhill u. Hernandez
where the Court refused to inquire into acts of a revolutionary Venezuelan military commander who an American citizen, Underhill, claimed had unlawfully
assaulted, coerced, and detained him while in Venezuela.' 4
There was a great deal of criticism regarding the Sabbatino decision.' In
one of the rare cases where the proceeds of expropriated property in Cuba had
found their way back into the United States, the Court had, in effect, put them
back into the pockets of the expropriators. Richard Falk summed up the American sentiment in a question:
Is an American court obliged to give respect to governmental acts of
subCastro's Cuba if they violate either our
6 public policy or the applicable
stantive norms of international law?'
The Sabbatino decision listed four circumstances under which the act of
state doctrine will not be applied: (1) where the dispute is governed by a treaty
or other international agreement which the court is able to review; (2) where
an international consensus exists regarding the applicable law; (3) where the
litigation does not affect important or sensitive political issues; (4) the Bernstein
exception.'
Before the Sabbatino case, the Bernstein exception had been the only exception to the act of state doctrine. It was established in a suit brought by a German
national to regain property that had been expropriated from him by the Nazi
government. The German national, Bernstein, had lost all of his property under
German laws pertaining to the treatment of Jews. Having managed to survive
the Nazi concentration camps, Bernstein came to New York where he brought
suit against the party then holding his property. The court of appeals reversed
the trial court's judgment for Bernstein on the basis of the act of state doctrine,
but hinted that if the executive branch of the United States Government had no
objection to judicial review of the case, the court might be able to deal with it.
Bernstein's attorney took note of this and obtained a letter from the executive
branch of the Government to the effect that they would allow judicial review of
the subject matter. Thus the earlier decision was reversed and the Bernstein
exception emerged.' 8
Even though the court in Sabbatino created four exceptions to the act of
state doctrine, the legislature went even further in its limitation of the doctrine in
order to protect the interests of American nationals in foreign countries. On
October 7, 1964, the Hickenlooper Amendment was enacted into law.'9 The
14 Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250 (1897).
15 Hearings on the Foreign Assistance Act Before the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs,
89th Cong., Ist Sess., pt. 8, at 1234-37 (1965).

16 R. FALK,
64 (1964).

THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC COURTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER

17 Bernstein v. N.V. Nederlansche Amerikaansche, 210 F.2d 375 (2 Cir. 1954).
18
Id. at 376.
19 The Hickenlooper Amendment, which has also been referred to elsewhere as the Sabbatino Amendment or the Rule of Law Amendment, was attached to the Foreign Assistance
Act of 1964 and became section 301 (d) (4) of that act. (Pub. L. 88-633, 78 Stat. 1009,

1013).
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amendment provided that the courts of the United States should not decline, on
the ground of the act of state doctrine, to entertain a claim of title or other right
to property based upon a confiscation or other taking. The amendment then
went on to state that decision of such claims should be based upon principles of
international law and other standards set out by Congress.2" Since there is no
international consensus as to the law regarding confiscation of property, 2' it is
to be inferred from the Hickenlooper Amendment that the courts in such circumstances must apply the standards set out by Congress. The Hickenlooper Amendment was upheld in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr.2 However, the court in
Farrwas careful to avoid the issue of whether Congress could set the standards
by which the court was to consider questions of international law.2 3 In a later
case, however, French v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, the New York Court of Appeals applied a restrictive interpretation of the statute by holding that money
is not "property" for purposes of the Hickenlooper Amendment's reference to
the "taking of property."2 The Hickenlooper Amendment had reversed, with
respect to cases involving foreign expropriation of property, the Sabbatino presumption that the courts should not sit in judgment on the acts of a foreign state.
It raised the opposite presumption that the courts could hear a case unless there
was a Presidential letter stating that the act of state doctrine should apply. Until
First National City Bank, the narrow interpretation given the Hickenlooper
Amendment gave the Sabbatino decision great importance. If the amendment
did not apply, the only means of escaping the act of state doctrine were the four
exceptions given in the Sabbatino case.
It was with this background that FirstNational City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba had to be decided. The district court recognized that the act of state
doctrine established in Sabbatino would bar recovery by First National City
Bank on its counterclaim. However, the court concluded that the Hickenlooper
Amendment had overruled the Sabbatino decision. The court issued summary
20

The amendment provided:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no court in the United States shall de-

cline on the ground of the federal act of state doctrine to make a determination on
the merits giving effect to the principles of international law in a case in which a
claim of title or other right to property is asserted by any party including a foreign
state (or a party claiming through such state) based upon '(or traced through) a
confiscation or other taking after January 1, 1959, by an act of that state in violation
of the principles of international law, including the principles of compensation and
the other standards set out in this subsection: Prouided, that this subparagraph
shall not be applicable (1) in any case in which an act of a foreign state is not
contrary to international law or with respect to claim of title or other right to property acquired pursuant to an irrevocable letter of credit of not more than 180 days
duration issued in good faith prior to the time of the confiscation or other taking,
or (2) in any case with respect to which the President determines that application
of the act of state doctrine is required in that particular case by the foreign policy
interests of the United States and a suggestion to this effect is filed on his behalf in
that case with the court, or (3) in any case in which the proceedings are commenced
after January 1, 1966.
Hickenlooper Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1964, 22 USC § 2370 (e) (2)
(1971).
21 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964).
22 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr, 383 F.2d 166 '(2d Cir. 1967).
23 Id.
24 French v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 23 N.Y.2d 46, 295 N.Y.S.2d 433, 242 N.E.2d
704 (1968).
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judgment for First National City Bank on all issues except the amount available
for possible set-off.25
The court of appeals reversed the district court on the grounds that Sabbatino barred the counterclaim. Since the counterclaim asked for damages rather
than for compensation for the confiscation of property, the Hickenlooper Amendment was held to be inapplicable. 6 After certiorari was granted by the Supreme
Court, a letter was furnished by the Department of State, encouraging the court
to deal with the merits of the case. Based on this letter, the Supreme Court remanded the case to the court of appeals." The court of appeals adhered to its
earlier decision, stating the Bernstein "executive letter" exception to the act of
state doctrine would not apply in this case. The court stated that Bernstein arose
out of a unique set of circumstances calling for special treatment, and hence
should be narrowly construed and, insofar as is possible, limited to its facts. 2
The Supreme Court again granted certiorari and reversed. Justice Rehnquist announced the judgment of the Court and, in an opinion joined by only
two other justices, concluded that if the executive branch, charged as it is with
primary responsibility for the conduct of foreign affairs, expressly represents that
the act of state doctrine would not advance the interests of American foreign
policy, then the doctrine should not be applied by the courts. 29 Is it the law,
then, that in those situations where the Hickenlooper Amendment does not apply
the Bernstein exception may still operate to prevent application of the act of
state doctrine?
The answer to this question is not clear from the Court's holding. The
justices themselves were divided as to this point. Justice Rehnquist, joined by
the Chief Justice and Justice White expressly adopted and approved the Bernstein exception to the act of state doctrine.'"
Justice Douglas, however, concluded that the central issue in the case was
governed by National City Bank v. Republic of China 1 which held that a sovereign's claim may be offset by a counterclaim or set-off. On this basis he would
allow the set-off up to the amount of the respondent's claim without relying
upon the Bernstein exception."
Justice Powell, believing that Sabbatino'sbroad holding was not compelled
by principles underlying the act of state doctrine, concluded that federal courts
have an obligation to balance the interests involved based on a careful examination of the facts in each particular case, including the position taken by the
political branches of the government. He felt that under the circumstances of
the present case the federal courts have an obligation to hear First National
City's claim and apply the appropriate rule of international law."
25
1964).
26
27
28
1971).
29
30
31
32
33

Banco Nacional de Cuba v. First National City Bank, 270 F. Supp. 1004 (S.D.N.Y.
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. First National City Bank, 431 F.2d 394 (2d Cir. 1970).
First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 400 U.S. 1019 (1971).
First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 442 F.2d 530, 534 (2d Cir.
First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759 (1972).
Id. at 768.
National City Bank v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356 (1955).
First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 770-73 (1972).
Id. at 773-76.
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In a dissenting opinion joined by Justices Stewart, Marshall and Blackmun,
Justice Brennan went so far as to conclude:
The Court today reverses the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit which declined to engraft the so-called "Bernstein" exception
upon the act of state doctrine as expounded in Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbatino. The Court, nevertheless, affirms the Court of Appeals' rejection
of the "Bernstein" exception. Four of us in this opinion unequivocally take
that step, as do Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Powell in their separate
concurring opinions.3 4
Thus FirstNational City Bank v. Banco Nacionalde Cuba left grave doubts
as to the continued validity of the Bernstein exception. It appears that at least
four Justices have rejected the Bernstein exception. Perhaps this is not a regrettable development. Both the Hickenlooper Amendment and the Bernstein exception are based on the assumption that the courts by themselves are incapable of
determining which cases of international law are susceptible of a judicial solution. This is a very questionable assumption. Because of their intensive dealing
with political questions of international policy, the executive and legislative
branches may be the least qualified to decide whether the courts should render
decisions on problems of international law. The Court is trying to break away
from such legislative interference by limiting the scope of the Hickenlooper
Amendment.35 Rejection of the Bernstein exception constitutes a similar attempt
by the courts to free themselves of interference from the executive branch as well.
Only when the courts are completely free to base their decisions on a continuing consensus as to what the international law is, will they be able to handle
the complex international problems of today.
The Supreme Court should take the earliest opportunity to adopt the view
expressed by the dissenting opinion in FirstNational City Bank and unequivocally
reject the Bernstein exception.
PatriciaS. Brown

34 Id. at 776-77.
35 French v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 23 N.Y.2d 46, 295 N.Y.S.2d 433, 242 N.E.2d

704 '(1968).

